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We Won’t Take “No” for an Answer: The Validity of 
Louisiana’s No-Refusal Policy  
“The increasing slaughter on our highways, most of which 
should be avoidable, now reaches the astounding figures only 
heard of on the battlefield.”1 
I. INTRODUCTION: THE BATTLE AGAINST DRINKING AND DRIVING 
Alcohol—your best friend and your worst enemy. Throughout 
history, society has acknowledged alcohol’s dual role as both 
friend and foe.2 But with the advent of the motor vehicle came the 
realization of alcohol’s true potential as a grave threat to human 
safety.3 Today, alcohol-impaired driving is still one of the most 
common crimes both globally and in the United States.4  
Early in the battle against intoxicated driving, states enacted 
implied consent statutes to deter motorists from drinking and 
driving.5 Implied consent rests on the notion that in exchange for the 
privilege to drive on state highways, every motorist implicitly 
consents to a future blood-alcohol test (BAT) upon an officer’s 
request.6 Under most statutes, however, the arrestee has an 
alternative: refuse the BAT and face specific consequences, unless a 
statutory exception bars refusal.7 In theory, these laws have great 
potential for deterring motorists from driving while intoxicated 
(DWI) because they aid the State in gathering intoxication evidence 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2012, by KATHERINE L. CICARDO. 
 1. Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 439 (1957). 
 2. Dennis R. Cook, Ouch! Blood Search Warrants After Beeman v. State: 
An End-Run Around the Texas Legislature Resulting in Judicially Sanctioned 
Batteries, 42 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 91, 92 (2009). See also Daphne D. Newaz, The 
Impaired Dual System Framework of United States Drunk-Driving Law: How 
International Perspectives Yield More Sober Results, 28 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 531, 
532 (2006).  
 3. Cook, supra note 2, at 92.  
 4. Newaz, supra note 2, at 532–33. See also Kelsey P. Black, Undue 
Protection Versus Undue Punishment: Examining the Drinking and Driving 
Problem Across the United States, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 463, 463 (2007).  
 5. See generally Vitauts M. Gulbis, Annotation, Admissibility in Criminal 
Case of Blood-Alcohol Test Where Blood Was Taken Despite Defendant’s 
Objection or Refusal to Submit to Test, 14 A.L.R. 4TH 690 (1982 & Supp. 2005) 
(assembling multiple post-Schmerber state court decisions upholding the 
constitutionality of warrantless blood extraction); Tina Wescott Cafaro, Fixing 
the Fatal Flaws in OUI Implied Consent Laws, 34 J. LEGIS. 99, 100 (2008). 
 6. Holly Hinte, Drunk Drivers and Vampire Cops: The “Gold Standard,” 
37 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 159, 161 (2011). See also, e.g., 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 32:661–70 (2002 & Supp. 2012).  
 7. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:666 (Westlaw 2012).   
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and provide penalties for chemical test refusal.8 But in practice, 
implied consent laws have proven ineffective.9  
Overall, statistics indicate a universal failure on the part of 
state governments to eradicate alcohol-impaired driving.10 Mothers 
Against Drunk Driving estimates that one out of every three people 
will be involved in an alcohol-related traffic accident during his or 
her lifetime.11 National reports reveal that drinking-and-driving 
accidents accounted for 31% of fatal crashes in 2010,12 which 
translates into one alcohol-related traffic fatality nearly every 50 
minutes.13 In light of these numbers, scholars, law enforcement 
officials, and members of the public have recognized the need for 
more stringent action against DWI offenders.14 Even the United 
States Supreme Court has acknowledged this nationwide dilemma:  
The situation . . . of the drunk driver . . . occurs with tragic 
frequency on our Nation’s highways. The carnage caused by 
drunk drivers is well documented [;] . . . This Court, 
                                                                                                             
 8. See Cafaro, supra note 5, at 100, 113.  
 9. Id.  
 10. See Black, supra note 4, at 463–64.  
 11. Mothers Against Drunk Driving, Campaign to Eliminate Drunk Driving, 
MADD.ORG, http://www.madd.org/drunk-driving/campaign/ (last visited Aug. 29, 
2011). 
 12. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., Fatal Crashes and Percent 
Alcohol-Impaired Driving, by Time of Day and Crash Type, FATALITY ANALYSIS 
REPORTING SYSTEM ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www-fars.nhtsa.dot.gov/Crashes/ 
CrashesAlcohol.aspx (last visited Sept. 13, 2011).  
 13. The Century Council, Drunk Driving Research, CENTURYCOUNCIL.ORG, 
http://www.centurycouncil.org/drunk-driving/drunk-driving-statistics (last visited 
Sept. 18, 2012). 
 14. See, e.g., Newaz, supra note 2, at 535 (“Drunk drivers create a very 
serious social and international problem that needs to be corrected. However, the 
United States’ use of poor investigatory tools to establish proof, ineffectual 
sanctions for refusal to submit to a breath test, and convictions that are obtained 
haphazardly and improperly is not acceptable.”); Jim Shannon, Some in Legal 
Community Have Issues with “No Refusal,” WAFB.COM (Sept. 7, 2010, 5:14 
AM), http://www.wafb.com/story/13086102/some-in-legal-community-have-
issues-with-no-refual?redirected=true (interviewing Jefferson Parish District 
Attorney Norma Broussard, along with defense attorney and former state trooper, 
Glynn Deslatte; “[I]n order to deter people from drinking and driving the best 
thing to do is prosecute them to the fullest extent and getting a conviction.”); John 
LeBlanc, Officials Working on New Tactic to Strengthen DWI Prosecutions (June 
21, 2010), available at 
http://lahighwaysafety.org/pdf/OP%20Ed%20no%20refusal%20June%2021.pdf 
(“The effort to rid Louisiana roads of drunk drivers involves multiple levels of 
cooperation that range from educating motorists to enforcing the tough DWI laws 
already on the books to prosecuting offenders.”).    
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although not having the daily contact with the problem that 
the state courts have, has repeatedly lamented the tragedy.15 
Statistics are even more alarming in Louisiana. According to 
the Louisiana Highway Safety Commission (LHSC), impaired-
driving crashes led to approximately 400 deaths and 6,000 injuries 
in 2009.16 From 2010 to 2012, 42 to 43% of fatal crashes were 
alcohol-related, making alcohol a leading cause of traffic deaths in 
Louisiana.17 Adding insult to injury, a 2007 survey ranked 
Louisiana as having the fourth highest DWI refusal rate in the 
country at 39%.18 This trend of stubbornly high refusal rates 
continued in 2008, when nearly one-third of those arrested for 
drinking and driving (about 8,000 out of 24,736 DWI arrestees) 
refused to submit to a BAT.19 As refusal rates continue to increase, 
the effectiveness of implied consent laws—and in turn, the State’s 
ability to deter DWI—will continue to decrease.20  
To counteract the rise of BAT refusal rates, the LHSC, parish 
law enforcement agencies, and local judges joined forces to 
implement no-refusal programs.21 No refusal refers to a law 
enforcement policy authorizing police officers to obtain search 
warrants after suspected DWI offenders decline a BAT.22 
                                                                                                             
 15. South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 558 (1983).  
 16. Raymond Legendre, No Refusal Weekend for Those Suspected of DWI 
Has Critics, Supporters, WWLTV.COM (Sept. 4, 2010, 5:55 PM), http://www. 
wwltv.com/news/local/No-Refusal-weekend-for-those-suspected-of-DWI-case-
critics-supporters-102228604.html.  
 17. LSU Highway Safety Research Grp., 2010 Alcohol-Related Crashes by 
Severity, http://datareports.lsu.edu/Reports/TrafficReports/2010/A/A5.asp (last 
visited Oct. 2, 2012); 2011 Alcohol-Related Crashes by Severity, http:// 
datareports.lsu.edu/Reports/TrafficReports/2011/A/A5.asp?p=ci&sec=A&yr=201
2 (last visited Oct. 2, 2012); 2012 Alcohol-Related Crashes by Severity, 
http://datareports.lsu.edu/Reports/TrafficReports/2012/A/A5.asp?p=ci&sec=A&yr
=2012 (last visited Oct. 2, 2012).  
 18. Amy Berning et al., Breath Test Refusals, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC 
SAFETY ADMIN., 2 (Nov. 2007), available at http://www.nhtsa.gov/DOT/NHTSA/ 
Traffic%20Injury%20Control/Articles/Associated%20Files/810871.pdf. 
 19. LeBlanc, supra note 14.  
 20. See id. Motorists who refuse blood-alcohol content (BAC) tests are 
often the most inclined to drive under the influence of alcohol. They understand 
that penalties for refusal are less severe than the penalties for DWI conviction. 
They also understand the high likelihood of DWI conviction when a chemical 
test shows positive signs of alcohol. Thus, they consciously choose to refuse the 
test and face license suspension to avoid the alternatively harsher consequences 
of DWI conviction. See id.  
 21. See id. 
 22. Id. Upon refusal, an officer will notify a judge, who is waiting on 
standby. Id. If the officer demonstrates sufficient probable cause of the suspect’s 
intoxication, then the judge will issue a warrant authorizing the withdrawal of 
the suspect’s blood. Id. See also Shannon, supra note 14.   
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Louisiana officials first sponsored no refusal over two years ago 
during holiday weekends, a time when alcohol-impaired driving is 
typically more prevalent.23 After successful trial runs, several 
parishes made no refusal a routine procedure with the goal of 
addressing high refusal rates head-on and thereby minimizing the 
threat of alcohol-impaired driving.24 For the most part, government 
officials, police officers, and members of the legal community 
have praised no-refusal programs for increasing the number of 
DWI convictions and for reducing the number of alcohol-related 
traffic fatalities.25 The refusal rate in Rapides Parish, for instance, 
fell from 35% in 2007, when no refusal first began, to virtually 
zero in 2009.26 Similarly, after Lafourche Parish implemented no 
refusal in 2008, the number of drinking and driving fatalities 
decreased from 18 to 5 between 2008 and 2010.27  
Despite such successful results, opponents of no refusal attack 
the program’s validity on both constitutional and state law 
grounds.28 Meanwhile, Louisiana courts have managed to avoid 
basic questions concerning the legality of law enforcement no-
refusal programs.29 The judicial silence in the no-refusal legal 
                                                                                                             
 23. See LeBlanc, supra note 14; see also Lee Peck, Calcasieu DWI “No 
Refusal Policy” Goes into Effect, KPLCTV.COM (May 27, 2010, 10:28 PM), http:// 
www.kplctv.com/story/12558286/calcasieu-dwi-no-refusal-policy-goes-into-effect.  
 24. See Peck, supra note 23.  
 25. Ken Thomas, Gov’t Urges ‘No Refusal’ Policy on Drunken Driving, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Dec. 13, 2010, 3:44 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/id/ 
40646098/ns/us_news-crime_and_courts/t/govt-urges-no-refusal-policy-drunken-
driving/ (citing Texas District Attorney who credits the no-refusal policy for 
successfully reducing Montgomery County’s refusal rate from 50% to 10% and 
for eliminating alcohol-related fatalities in the jurisdiction). See also LeBlanc, 
supra note 14.  
 26. LeBlanc, supra note 14. See also Peck, supra note 23 (“When Rapides 
Parish put their ‘no refusal policy’ into effect two and a half years agoabout 
40% of drivers who passed the blow tests with a low readingrefused a drug 
test. Today, their refusal rate is below 1%.”). 
 27. Thomas, supra note 25.  
 28. See generally Cook, supra note 2. No-refusal opponents argue that a 
blood-evidence search conducted after the suspect refuses to submit to a BAT 
violates the suspect’s constitutional right against unnecessary governmental 
intrusion and statutory “right to refuse.” 
 29. For example, an association of criminal defense lawyers sued the 
Calcasieu Parish Sheriff’s office seeking an injunction to stop the blood search 
warrant tactic under Louisiana Revised Statutes section 32:666. Sw. La. Ass’n 
of Criminal Def. Lawyers vs. Calcasieu, No. CW 11-00031 (La. Ct. App. Mar. 
31, 2011). The Louisiana Supreme Court denied writs, essentially agreeing with 
the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal that the Southwest Louisiana 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers does not have standing to bring the 
action. Sw. La. Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers vs. Calcasieu, 64 So. 3d 222 
(La. 2011) (writ denied). Furthermore in State v. Riggleman, the Third Circuit 
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debate coupled with the lack of legislative implied consent reform 
has led to uncertainty regarding the constitutionality and statutory 
legitimacy of no-refusal search warrants. This confusion leaves the 
public wondering: Must Louisiana take “no” for an answer? To 
remedy the uncertainty, this Comment proposes the proper 
application of Louisiana’s constitutional jurisprudence and implied 
consent law in light of no refusal. 
Chiefly, this Comment posits that no-refusal search warrants 
are both constitutionally and statutorily valid in Louisiana.30 Part II 
explores constitutional arguments against no refusal beginning 
with an analysis of the U.S. Supreme Court’s most recent decision 
regarding DWI blood draws, Schmerber v. California, and its 
impact on Louisiana’s constitutional jurisprudence.31 This section 
then proposes that, in theory, no refusal actually exceeds the 
federal and state constitutional requirements for a reasonable DWI 
search, although modern practices may necessitate a more rigorous 
standard to better protect against unreasonable searches.32 
Nevertheless, as Part III explains, the validity of no-refusal 
programs depends on a statutory interpretation of Louisiana’s 
implied consent law, not the federal or state constitutions.33 To this 
end, Part IV examines the legal framework of implied consent in 
Louisiana and dispels the widespread misunderstanding that 
individuals enjoy a greater “right to refuse” under the implied 
                                                                                                             
 
refused to deny the suspension of a defendant’s driving privileges. 62 So. 3d 
898, 901 (La. Ct. App. 2011). The court reasoned that even though the defendant 
allowed officers to draw his blood pursuant to a DWI search warrant, this did 
not constitute “consent” to a test under Louisiana’s implied consent law because 
he initially refused to submit to a Breathalyzer test. Id. at 899–900. That same 
court also refused to review a trial court’s denial to suppress DWI blood test 
results from a warrant-based blood draw. State v. Mobley, No. KW 11-00146 
(La. Ct. App. May 2, 2011) (writ denied). The two-judge majority reasoned that 
the ability to refuse chemical testing under Revised Statutes section 32:666 does 
not override the State’s right to obtain a search warrant, while the lone 
dissenting judge argued that drivers have a statutory “right to refuse.” Id. The 
dissent further opined that the authority to alter the “right to refuse” belongs 
exclusively to the legislature. Id. Nevertheless, the Louisiana Supreme Court 
denied writs, effectively preventing a current resolution of the issue. State v. 
Mobley, 69 So. 3d 1148 (La. 2011) (writ denied). These cases highlight the 
controversy surrounding no refusal’s legality, yet none provides a clear answer 
to the question: is no refusal a valid and legitimate law enforcement policy 
under Louisiana law? As more parishes implement permanent no-refusal 
programs, courts will be forced to answer this highly contentious question.  
 30. See conclusion infra Part VI.  
 31. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).  
 32. See discussion infra Part II.B–D. 
 33. See discussion infra Part III. 
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consent law than they do under the Fourth Amendment or the 
Louisiana Constitution.34 Finally, Part V analyzes the text and 
purpose of Louisiana’s implied consent statute in light of similar 
provisions from other jurisdictions.35 Ultimately, this Comment 
concludes that a rational statutory interpretation validates 
Louisiana’s no-refusal policy.36 Therefore, if state lawmakers wish 
to prevent this police strategy, a legislative reconstruction of the 
implied consent statute is necessary to guide courts in addressing 
no refusal’s legitimacy.37 
II. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF NO REFUSAL 
A. Schmerber v. California: The U.S. Supreme Court Decision on 
DWI Blood Draws   
A common misconception exists among members of the public 
that no refusal violates a driver’s constitutional rights—most 
notably, the Fourth Amendment right of freedom from 
unreasonable searches and seizures.38 While the United States 
Supreme Court has not directly addressed these constitutional 
questions in the context of a no-refusal policy, the Court has 
considered the constitutionality of removing physical evidence 
from a suspect without his consent.39 Schmerber v. California 
                                                                                                             
 34. See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
 35. See discussion infra Part V.  
 36. See discussion infra Part V. 
 37. See conclusion infra Part VI.  
 38. See Legendre, supra note 16 (“A public dialogue is needed about the 
constitutionality of programs like ‘No Refusal.’”); see also John Floyd & Billy 
Sinclair, No Refusal Blood Draws Spread, CRIMINAL LAW BLOG (Jan. 3, 2011, 
7:18 AM), http://www.johntfloyd.com/blog/2011/01/03/no-refusal-blood-draws-
spread/ (“These kinds of law enforcement strategies are not only an invasion of 
personal privacy but offend our traditional constitutional principles against 
unnecessary governmental intrusion.”); Blake Trueblood, Florida’s “No Refusal” 
DWI Checkpoints and Your Constitutional Rights, TRUEBLOOD LAW GROUP (Dec. 
30 2010), http://glades-law.com/florida’s-“no-refusal”-dui-checkpoints-and-your-
constitutional-rights/ (“Critics question the constitutionality of the on-the-spot-
warrants.”).  
 39. See generally Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985); Breithaupt v. 
Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). On 
September 25, 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear an appeal from a 
Missouri Supreme Court decision requiring police officers to obtain a search 
warrant before forcing a DWI suspect to submit to a BAT. State v. McNeely, 
358 S.W.3d 65, 70 (Mo. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam), cert. granted, 81 
U.S.L.W. 3031 (U.S. Sept. 25, 2012) (No. 11-1425). State courts across the 
country are divided over whether a warrantless and nonconsensual blood draw 
violates a DWI suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights. David G. Savage, High 
Court to Consider Forced Tests in DUI Cases, THE ADVOCATE, Sept. 26, 2012, 
2012] COMMENT 259 
 
 
 
remains the leading Supreme Court case on the constitutionality of 
DWI blood withdrawals.40  
In that case, an officer arrested defendant Armando Schmerber 
for DWI at the hospital where he received treatment for injuries 
after his car struck a tree.41 When Schmerber refused to submit to a 
blood or breath test, the officer ordered a physician to extract 
Schmerber’s blood for chemical testing.42 The test revealed a 
blood-alcohol content (BAC) over the legal limit, and the State 
used this evidence to secure Schmerber’s criminal conviction.43 
Schmerber objected to the introduction of the chemical test results, 
claiming that the forced withdrawal of his blood violated his 
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.44 
However, the Supreme Court found no constitutional violations in 
the warrantless taking of Schmerber’s blood.45 The Court held that 
while an individual’s personal integrity is a sacred societal value, 
the Constitution does not forbid minor bodily intrusions, like the 
nonconsensual blood draw.46 
After dispensing with the due process argument, the Court 
found that the withdrawal of Schmerber’s blood and the use of its 
chemical analysis as evidence did not implicate the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.47 The Court 
determined that the Fifth Amendment protects an accused from 
providing mere testimonial evidence and that blood, on the other 
hand, constitutes “real or physical evidence.” 48 According to the 
                                                                                                             
 
at 2A. The Supreme Court’s decision, due in early 2013, will define the rights of 
DWI suspects, as well as the power of police officers in performing blood-
evidence searches. Id.  
 40. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).  
 41. Id. at 758 & n.2.  
 42. Id. at 758–59.  
 43. Id. at 759.  
 44. Id. Schmerber argued that the blood draw and the admission of the test 
results in evidence  
denied him due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment, as 
well as specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights secured against the 
States by that Amendment: his privilege against self-incrimination 
under the Fifth Amendment; his right to counsel under the Sixth 
Amendment; and his right not to be subjected to unreasonable searches 
and seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment.  
Id. This Comment mentions the Court’s analysis regarding Schmerber’s Fifth 
Amendment claim but focuses primarily on the Court’s analysis of Schmerber’s 
Fourth Amendment claim.   
 45. Id. at 772.  
 46. Id.  
 47. Id. at 760–61.  
 48. Id. at 761, 764.   
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Court, Schmerber’s BAT results did not constitute a 
communicative act; therefore, the admission of his BAT results 
into evidence did not compel Schmerber to serve as a witness 
against himself in violation of the Fifth Amendment.49  
Next, the Supreme Court discussed the Fourth Amendment’s 
function “to constrain, not against all intrusions as such, but 
against intrusions which are not justified in the circumstances, or 
which are made in an improper manner.”50 To protect against 
unjustified and improper invasions, the Court devised a standard 
for determining whether a nonconsensual blood draw satisfies the 
Fourth Amendment: “whether the police [are] justified in requiring 
petitioner to submit to the blood test, and whether the means and 
procedures employed in taking his blood” are reasonable.51 In 
essence, the Schmerber test requires a two-pronged analysis of: (1) 
probable cause and (2) reasonableness. Applying this standard to 
the Schmerber facts, the Court found that the officer had probable 
cause for the search and that the blood-draw conditions were 
medically acceptable.52  
Beginning with a detailed discussion of the first prong— 
probable cause—the Court conceded that the Fourth Amendment 
typically requires officers to secure a warrant, and “no less could 
be required where intrusions into the human body are 
concerned.”53 That is to say, the Fourth Amendment favors an 
analysis of probable cause by a neutral, detached judge, instead of 
a potentially biased determination by officers who are “engaged in 
the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.”54 The 
Court clearly recognized the “indisputable and great” need for 
impartial and informed considerations over the invasion of a 
suspect’s body.55 But the officer’s assessment was enough to 
establish probable cause—even without the evaluation of a neutral 
magistrate—because of Schmerber’s obvious intoxication.56  
The Court further held that exigent circumstances justified the 
warrantless blood draw.57 Due to the quick dissipation of alcohol 
                                                                                                             
 49. Id. at 764–65.  
 50. Id. at 768.  
 51. Id.  
 52. Id. at 768–72.  
 53. Id. at 770. 
 54. Id.  
 55. Id.  
 56. Id. The officer based his probable cause for the arrest on the fact that 
Schmerber exhibited the telltale signs of drunkenness, including glassy, 
bloodshot eyes and the smell of alcohol both at the scene of the accident and 
later at the hospital. Id. at 768–69.  
 57. Id. at 770–71.  
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from the body and the lengthy warrant process, the officer 
reasonably believed that the potential destruction of BAC evidence 
necessitated the warrantless search, “[p]articularly in a case such as 
this, where time had to be taken to bring the accused to a hospital 
and to investigate the scene of the accident, there was no time to 
seek out a magistrate and secure a warrant.”58 Given these “special 
facts,” the Court concluded that the warrantless blood draw was an 
appropriate search incident to Schmerber’s arrest.59  
Equally important, the officer’s choice to extract Schmerber’s 
blood was a reasonable method of obtaining evidence.60 
Discussing the second prong of reasonableness, the Court noted: 
“Extraction of blood samples for testing is a highly effective means 
of determining the degree to which a person is under the influence 
of alcohol.”61 Moreover, blood test procedures are common in 
everyday life and involve practically no risk or pain.62 Schmerber 
did not show signs of fear over the blood extraction, and the 
hospital physician drew his blood according to standard medical 
practices.63 The Supreme Court found the officer’s actions 
reasonable, but it couched this narrow exception to the warrant 
requirement to the specific facts in Schmerber: this decision “in no 
way indicates that [the Constitution] permits more substantial 
intrusions, or intrusions under other conditions.”64 Additionally, 
the Schmerber Court did not address questions about the 
reasonableness of taking blood from a suspect who prefers a 
different search method because of fear, health concerns, or 
religious beliefs.65  
Schmerber was a milestone for the Supreme Court. That 
decision remains the federal constitutional benchmark for 
determining the validity of a DWI blood search.66 In practice, 
Schmerber enables officers to perform a warrantless, non-
                                                                                                             
 58. Id.  
 59. Id.  
 60. Id. at 771. 
 61. Id. (citing Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 436 n.3 (1957)).  
 62. Id. at 771 & n.13 (“The blood test procedure has become routine in our 
everyday life. It is a ritual for those going into the military service as well as 
those applying for marriage licenses. Many colleges require such tests before 
permitting entrance and literally millions of us have voluntarily gone through 
the same, though a longer, routine in becoming blood donors.” (citing 
Breithaupt, 352 U.S. at 436)).  
 63. Id. at 771.  
 64. Id. at 772.  
 65. Id. at 771.  
 66. Robert Brooks Beauchamp, “Shed Thou No Blood”: The Forcible 
Removal of Blood Samples from Drunk Driving Suspects, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1115, 1128 (1987).  
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consensual blood draw on a DWI suspect without violating his 
constitutional rights.67 But Schmerber merely represents the 
minimum constitutional standard for a DWI blood-search.68  
B. Exceeding Constitutional Expectations  
Various judges rely on Schmerber to authorize DWI search 
warrants.69 However, that case specifically addressed the 
constitutionality of a warrantless DWI search based on the likely 
destruction of alcohol evidence, whereas no refusal presupposes a 
warrant-based search.70 No-refusal searches are distinguishable 
from the Schmerber search because they do not involve the same 
urgencies to justify a warrantless BAT.71 A court’s reliance on 
Schmerber to rationalize no-refusal warrants is therefore 
questionable.  
Unlike in Schmerber, officers do not rely on exigent 
circumstances as the basis for a no-refusal search. In fact, no-
refusal policies require officers to obtain a search warrant 
authorizing the BAT rather than relying on a warrant exception.72 
But when the Supreme Court decided Schmerber in 1966, the 
process of securing a warrant required far more time and effort 
than it does today.73 Officers could not fax or electronically submit 
affidavits. Instead, they delivered a paper warrant to judges’ homes 
                                                                                                             
 67. See generally Schmerber, 384 U.S. 757.  
 68. See, e.g., Cook, supra note 2, at 102 (“The result in Schmerber laid the 
foundation upon which proponents of the blood search warrant have relied.”). 
 69. Id. at 106. 
 70. See generally Schmerber, 384 U.S. 757.  
 71. See Black, supra note 4, at 479; see also E. John Wherry, Jr., DWI 
Blood Alcohol Testing: Responding to a Proposal Compelling Medical 
Personnel to Withdraw Blood, 18 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 655, 663–68 (1994). 
 72. See Shannon, supra note 14. “With the exception of a few well-
delineated situations, officers must obtain a warrant from a neutral and detached 
magistrate prior to conducting either an arrest or a search.” State v. Warren, 949 
So. 2d 1215, 1225 (La. 2007). A warrantless search is per se unreasonable 
unless one of the following warrant-exceptions applies: vehicle search based on 
probable cause, standard inventory search, search incident to lawful arrest, 
consensual search, search based on exigent circumstances. Id. at 1225–26 
(citations omitted). However,  
[a]bsent one of the foregoing exceptions, a warrant is required because 
it places the crucial task of making delicate judgments and inferences 
from facts and circumstances in the hands of a detached and neutral 
magistrate judge, instead of police officers, who are engaged in the 
zealous pursuit of ferreting out crime. 
Id. at 1225–26.  
 73. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770–71. 
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or offices.74 Getting proper authorization took hours, during which 
time the suspect’s BAC would begin to diminish.75 Because of the 
body’s ability to process alcohol quickly, the Schmerber Court 
reasoned that officers could not acquire a warrant quickly enough 
to accurately determine the suspect’s BAC.76 This possible 
destruction of evidence constituted exigent circumstances.77  
However, modern technology and police procedures expedite 
the warrant process, lessening the exigencies that justified the 
warrantless Schmerber search. For example, states like Arizona 
have instituted tele-fax warrant systems that enable officers to fax 
affidavits to a judge after working hours.78 This new system allows 
an officer to obtain a search warrant in approximately 30 
minutes.79 In Texas, law enforcement authorities often set up DWI 
roadblocks with standby judges who are waiting at the scene to 
sign warrants.80 Furthermore, Utah judges send PDF electronic 
warrants directly to officers’ cell phones.81  
The Louisiana procedure for no refusal includes the use of 
similar technology to streamline the warrant process.82 The no-
refusal process begins when a suspect refuses an officer’s request 
to submit to an initial BAT, which prompts the officer to fax an on-
call judge an affidavit detailing probable cause for the stop and 
arrest.83 Next, the judge administers an oath to the officer via cell 
phone and makes his determination of probable cause based on the 
affidavit and the officer’s sworn statements.84 If the judge finds 
sufficient probable cause upon which to issue the warrant, he sends 
the warrant back, and the officer proceeds with gathering blood 
evidence.85 Like the modernized warrant process in other states, 
Louisiana’s strategy reduces the exigencies of Schmerber.86   
Additionally, new research may contradict the Supreme 
Court’s assessment of how quickly the body processes and dispels 
                                                                                                             
 74. Steven DuBreuil, Controversy Surrounding “No Refusal” Policy for 
DUI Suspects, LAW OFFICE OF STEVEN M. DUBREUIL, BLOG (April 6, 2012), 
http://dubreuillawfirm.com/blog/.  
 75. Id. See also Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770–71.  
 76. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770–71. 
 77. Id.  
 78. Hinte, supra note 6, at 164.  
 79. Id.  
 80. Floyd & Sinclair, supra note 38.  
 81. See DuBreuil, supra note 74.  
 82. See Shannon, supra note 14.  
 83. Id.  
 84. Id.  
 85. Id.  
 86. See discussion supra Part II.A.  
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alcohol.87 While absorption of alcohol into the blood and its 
transmission to the brain is a fairly quick process (approximately 
30–90 minutes after consumption), the elimination of alcohol from 
the body occurs at a much slower rate.88 Current scientific 
evidence shows that the body’s complete dissipation of alcohol 
will take approximately 6 hours and 40 minutes for a suspect with 
a BAC of 0.10%.89 Similarly, the cleansing process for blood with 
a 0.15% alcohol content will take around ten hours to complete.90 
Due to the combination of the actual length of the alcohol-
elimination process and an officer’s ability to obtain a warrant 
within minutes, a no-refusal stop does not present an urgent 
circumstance like the Court found in Schmerber.91 In light of this 
new research, the Schmerber exigent circumstances theory may be 
an invalid justification for DWI searches.92 But until the Supreme 
Court revisits this 40-year-old decision, Schmerber still permits the 
warrantless blood draw of a nonconsenting DWI suspect.93  
Regardless, no refusal, at least in theory, provides greater 
Fourth Amendment protection to DWI suspects than Schmerber by 
requiring officers to obtain a BAT search warrant. The Fourth 
Amendment prefers an impartial consideration of probable cause, 
so the heightened protection of a no-refusal warrant exceeds the 
minimal constitutional requirements of Schmerber.94 No-refusal 
warrants afford motorists the added benefit of neutral judicial 
                                                                                                             
 87. Wherry, supra note 71, at 663.  
 88. Id. at 664.  
 89. Id.  
 90. Id. at 664–65. See also Black, supra note 4, at 149.   
 91. See Black, supra note 4, n.68. 
 92. Id. See also Wherry, supra note 71, at 663.  
 93. Courts in several states have addressed the question of whether 
Schmerber permits warrantless, nonconsensual BATs in routine DWI stops. 
Missouri v. McNeely, 358 S.W.3d 65, 70 (Mo. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam), 
cert. granted, 81 U.S.L.W. 3031 (U.S. Sept. 25, 2012) (No. 11-1425). See also 
State v. Rodriguez, 156 P.3d 771 (Utah 2007); Iowa v. Johnson, 744 N.W.2d 
340 (Iowa 2008). As recently as January 2012, the Missouri Supreme Court held 
that the quick dissipation of alcohol from the body does not, by itself, constitute 
a per se exigent circumstance under Schmerber so as to justify nonconsensual 
DWI blood draws performed without a warrant. McNeely, 358 S.W.3d at 67. 
The U.S. Supreme Court granted the State of Missouri’s petition for certiorari on 
September 25, 2012 to resolve the question: “Whether a law enforcement officer 
may obtain a nonconsensual and warrantless blood sample from a drunk driver 
under the exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant 
requirement based upon the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream.” 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Missouri v. McNeely, No. 11-1425 (Mo. 
May 22, 2012), available at http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/up 
loads/2012/06/11-1425-Missouri-v.-McNeely-Petition.pdf.  
 94. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966).  
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oversight, which is not required in Schmerber exigency searches.95 
Thus, the concept of no refusal should survive constitutional 
attacks, even if the Supreme Court abandons Schmerber and rejects 
the DWI exigent circumstances theory.  
C. Pushing Constitutional Boundaries  
Conceptually, no-refusal search warrants are legitimate under 
the federal Constitution, but, in practice, the execution of no-
refusal warrants may exceed Schmerber’s two-part constitutional 
test.96 When the Supreme Court established this general standard 
for DWI searches, the Court did not specify detailed criteria for 
analyzing probable cause or reasonableness questions on a case-
by-case basis.97 The majority strictly tailored its analysis to the 
specific facts in Schmerber, while implying that a BAT under 
different circumstances might satisfy the Fourth Amendment as 
long as the search conditions are reasonable.98 In some situations, 
the improper administration of no refusal may raise 
reasonableness, privacy, or probable cause issues.99  
For example, an officer’s use of excessive force in drawing 
blood could implicate constitutional questions about the propriety 
of the search.100 Whereas typical blood tests are routine and 
harmless, a forcible, nonconsensual blood draw involves 
heightened risks.101 Privacy concerns may also result when police 
officers use DWI blood evidence to gain medical information they 
would otherwise be unable to access.102 Another common attack 
against no refusal is that on-call judges make predeterminations 
about the need for a warrant without sufficiently examining 
probable cause in every case.103 A situation in which judges give 
                                                                                                             
 95. Id.   
 96. Id. at 768 (holding that a DWI blood draw must be based on probable 
cause and the means and procedures for the blood draw must be reasonable). See 
generally Hinte, supra note 6, at 168–80. 
 97. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771–72. The Court even acknowledged “the 
serious questions which would arise if a search involving use of a medical 
technique, even of the most rudimentary sort, were made by other than medical 
personnel or in other than a medical environment––for example, if it were 
administered by police in the privacy of the stationhouse.” Id. The Court 
warned, “To tolerate searches under these conditions might be to invite an 
unjustified element of personal risk of infection and pain.” Id. 
 98. See id. at 768–72. 
 99. See generally Hinte, supra note 6, at 168–80. 
 100. See generally Beauchamp, supra note 66. 
 101. See Cook, supra note 2, at 114–15.  
 102. See Legendre, supra note 16.  
 103. Id. 
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DWI warrants an “assembly line review” is problematic because 
the need for an unbiased probable cause examination is 
“indisputable and great.”104  
In some cases, special procedural protections are necessary to 
assess the reasonableness of a compelled intrusion beneath the 
suspect’s skin for criminal evidence.105 The forced surgical 
removal of a bullet in Winston v. Lee is one example where the 
Supreme Court required a preliminary adversarial hearing to 
decide the necessity of the search.106 Such procedural protections 
allow a neutral magistrate to weigh the suspect’s privacy and 
security interests against society’s interest in retrieving 
evidence.107 The Winston Court stated, “In a given case, the 
question whether the community’s need for evidence outweighs 
the substantial privacy interests at stake is a delicate one admitting 
of few categorical answers.”108 But in the case of a routine blood 
draw, the Fourth Amendment does not require an adversarial 
judicial determination.  
Unlike the trivial blood test in Schmerber, the compelled 
surgery in Winston required a preliminary adversarial hearing to 
evaluate the procedure’s invasiveness, the risks involved, and the 
substantial need for evidence.109 Blood tests, on the other hand, are 
commonplace in today’s society and do not extensively invade a 
suspect’s bodily integrity.110 That is to say, the privacy interest 
involved in a BAT is much less significant than in surgical cases 
like Winston. Besides, “given the difficulty of proving drunkenness 
by other means . . . results of the blood test [are] of vital 
importance if the State [is] to enforce its drunken driving laws.”111 
                                                                                                             
 104. Id.; Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966).  
 105. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 (1985). 
 106. Id.  
 107. Id.  
 108. Id.  
 109. Id. at 765–67. The Louisiana Supreme Court has also implied that, at the 
very least, an adversarial determination may be required to protect the greater 
individual interest involved in a surgical intrusion. See State v. Martin, 404 So. 
2d 960, 962 (1981) (“In finding the [surgical removal of a bullet] reasonable and 
justified under the circumstances, the Court noted that it considered the 
following salient factors . . . (3) before the operation was performed the trial 
court held an adversary hearing at which the defendant appeared with counsel, 
and (4) thereafter, and before the operation was performed, the defendant was 
afforded an opportunity for appellate review.” (citing U.S. v. Crowder, 543 F.2d 
312 (D.C. Cir. 1976))).   
 110. Winston, 470 U.S. at 762 (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 
771 n.13 (1966)). 
 111. Id. at 763.  
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As a result, no-refusal blood draws do not necessitate greater 
Fourth Amendment procedural protections.   
Nevertheless, the Fourth Amendment still imposes certain 
restrictions on the search for blood evidence: the means and 
procedures of the blood draw must be reasonable.112 In Schmerber, 
a physician performed the minor extraction in a hospital setting, 
which the Court determined was medically acceptable and 
therefore, reasonable.113 Many no-refusal strategies mirror the facts 
of Schmerber by directing officers to transport the suspect to a 
medical facility where a medical technician or nurse will draw his 
blood.114 On the other hand, some agencies modify their no-refusal 
procedures to allow qualified technicians to take blood samples in 
a mobile police unit at the scene of the stop, or even in a room at 
the police station.115 Agencies in several states even train police 
officers to take blood samples.116  
By today’s standards, no-refusal practices that deviate from the 
hospital and physician setting in Schmerber can still be reasonable. 
The mobile units and police station rooms contain 
accommodations for the safe withdrawal and storage of blood.117 
Officers follow hospital standards by sanitizing the areas and by 
limiting outsider access so that suspects remain undisturbed.118 
Law enforcement officials even videotape these procedures to 
ensure that officers follow proper protocol.119 Based on these 
precautions, such environments pose no heightened risk to an 
individual’s health or safety.120 Whereas mobile units and station 
                                                                                                             
 112. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 768.  
 113. Id. at 758–59, 768.  
 114. Michigan police officers use this procedure. See TWYLA CATON, INST. FOR 
COURT MGMT.: COURT EXEC. DEV. PROGRAM, COLLIN COUNTY BLOOD 
WARRANTS: DO THEY REDUCE COURT DOCKETS? 11 (2011), http://www.ncsc.org 
/~/media/Files/PDF/Education%20and%20Careers/CEDP%20Papers/2011/Blood%
20Warrants.ashx. See also Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 758–59. 
 115. Arizona and Texas law enforcement officials deviate from the 
Schmerber procedure in this way. See CATON, supra note 114, at 9, 24. See also 
Warren Diepram, Anatomy of a DWI “No-Refusal Weekend,” THE PROSECUTOR 
(Sept.–Oct. 2007), available at http://www.tdcaa.com/node/1141.  
 116. Officer phlebotomy is common among Arizona law enforcement 
agencies. See generally Matthew H. Green & James Charnesky, Blood Bath: 
Sustaining the Fight Against Law Enforcement Phlebotomy in Arizona (June 
2005) (on file with author); see also CATON, supra note 114, at 9. 
 117. CATON, supra note 114, at 24.  
 118. Diepram, supra note 115.  
 119. Id.  
 120. See, e.g., People v. Esayian, 5 Cal. Rptr. 3d 542, 550 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2003) (finding that blood draw did not violate Fourth Amendment because 
defendant did not prove that manner of test was unsanitary or that it caused him 
any unusual pain or indignity); State v. Dagget, 640 N.W.2d 546, 551 (Wis. Ct. 
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rooms do not entail the same level of regulation as medical 
facilities, they likely satisfy Schmerber’s minimal reasonableness 
test.  
Perhaps more controversial is the practice of allowing non-
medically trained professionals to perform no-refusal blood draws. 
Though they do not receive formal medical education, officer 
phlebotomists121 must complete a training course before an agency 
will allow them to extract evidentiary blood samples.122 Police 
departments appoint a high-ranking officer with previous 
phlebotomy instruction to be the “phlebotomy coordinator.”123 
Officer phlebotomists meet regularly with the agency’s coordinator 
and attend annual lessons for continuing phlebotomy education.124 
Also, each law enforcement agency develops a document outlining 
the department’s general blood draw protocol.125 Agencies do their 
best to guarantee that officers are fully capable of taking blood 
evidence samples in a reasonable manner. Because of these 
stringent training and regulation requirements, the use of police 
officer phlebotomists should withstand constitutional criticism. 
Some state courts have even sanctioned the use of officer 
phlebotomists as a reasonable substitute for medical personnel.126  
In short, while no refusal theoretically exceeds Schmerber in 
protecting an individual’s Fourth Amendment guarantees, the 
                                                                                                             
 
App. 2001) (finding manner of warrantless blood draw performed in booking 
room of county jail was reasonable, even though environment not sterile, 
because defendant did not show heightened safety or health risk); State v. 
Sickle, 488 N.W.2d 70, 73 (S.D. 1992) (approving blood draw in poorly-lit 
“drunk tank” at the jail facility by officer who taught himself to draw blood: 
“Blood tests do not have to be performed in a hospital; however, we do require 
the blood test to be performed under conditions ‘which provide a medically 
approved manner for the specific purpose of drawing blood.’ A crucial factor in 
analyzing the magnitude of the intrusion is the extent to which the procedure 
may threaten the safety or health of the individual.” (citations omitted)). 
 121. In the DWI context, phlebotomy refers to the procedure of drawing a 
suspect’s blood for use as evidence. Green & Charnesky, supra note 116, at 4. 
Arizona was the first state to allow officer phlebotomy, but other states like Utah 
and California have begun passing legislation to authorize officer-phlebotomy 
programs. Id.  
 122. Id. at 7. The phlebotomy discussion will refer to Arizona law 
enforcement policies and procedures.  
 123. Id.  
 124. Id.  
 125. Id.  
 126. Several Arizona courts have upheld the use of officer phlebotomists in 
performing DWI blood draws as long as the officers complete the relevant 
training. See State v. Noceo, 221 P.3d 1036, 1040 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009); State v. 
May, 112 P.3d 39, 42 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).  
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improper application of this program may violate an individual’s 
constitutional rights.127 As applied, no refusal highlights potential 
limits to the Supreme Court’s position on DWI blood draws and 
demonstrates that Schmerber’s constitutional standard may be too 
broad to adequately protect motorists from unreasonable DWI 
searches.128 The Supreme Court should reevaluate Schmerber in 
light of new police tactics like no refusal. But until the Court 
revisits its holding in Schmerber, a warrant-based no-refusal blood 
draw does not constitute a per se Fourth Amendment violation. Of 
course, Schmerber provides the floor of federal constitutional 
rights, and states are free to expand Schmerber’s minimal 
protection under their own constitutions and laws.129 
D. Application of Schmerber in Louisiana  
Presently, Louisiana courts refuse to interpret the state 
constitution as affording citizens a higher standard of liberty for 
DWI blood draws beyond what the U.S. Constitution provides.130 
In 1968, only two years after Schmerber, the Louisiana Supreme 
Court held that a compulsory blood draw for BAC testing does not 
infringe on an individual’s state constitutional rights.131 The 
Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal agreed with Schmerber 
that an involuntary BAT does not offend the individual guarantees 
against unreasonable searches if the draw is based on probable 
cause and performed in a reasonable manner.132  
                                                                                                             
 127. See Hinte, supra note 6, at 168–80. 
 128. In sum, the use of excessive and unreasonable force, the use of blood-
test results for purposes other than DWI conviction, or the use of an invalid 
search warrant based on an improper judicial evaluation of probable cause could 
render the application of no refusal unconstitutional.  
 129. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
Is a Constitutional Expansion of Rights, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 601, 603 
(1998); see also Cook, supra note 2, at 103 (interpreting the dissent in Beeman 
v. Texas, 86 S.W.3d 613 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (en banc)).  
 130. See, e.g., State v. Graham, 278 So. 2d 78, 79 (La. 1973) (holding that 
defendant implicitly consented to BAT performed when he was unconscious and 
that officer had probable cause and performed BAT in reasonable manner, so no 
constitutional violation of defendant’s due process, self-incrimination, or 
unreasonable search guarantees occurred); State v. Dugas, 211 So. 2d 285, 289 
(La. 1968) (“The compulsory extraction of a blood sample for an intoxication 
test infringes no constitutional rights.”); State v. Pierre, 606 So. 2d 816, 818–20 
(La. Ct. App. 1992). 
 131. Dugas, 211 So. 2d at 289.  
 132. Graham, 278 So. 2d at 79. Louisiana courts have also considered the 
issue of compelled blood draws in the context of succession and filiation 
disputes. The Louisiana Supreme Court has consistently held that courts can 
compel individuals to submit to a blood test in order to establish or disprove 
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Notwithstanding these decisions, criminal defendants continue 
to challenge the constitutionality of nonconsensual searches for 
physical evidence.133 For example, after one Louisiana court 
ordered a rape suspect to provide a blood sample, the suspect 
attacked the order on state constitutional grounds.134 The defendant 
argued that Louisiana Constitution article I, section 16 affords 
greater protection of individual liberty than the U.S. Constitution 
because of the language: “No person shall be compelled to give 
evidence against himself.”135 However, the Louisiana Supreme 
Court rejected the defendant’s interpretation.136 Due to “reasons of 
overriding state interest, and finding the court-ordered blood test 
minimally intrusive, relatively painless, and medically safe,” the 
court refused “to extend the doctrine of a higher standard of 
individual liberty . . . to include evidence which an accused may be 
compelled to give,” such as blood.137 Thus, blood draws performed 
pursuant to no-refusal search warrants do not violate DWI 
suspects’ state or federal constitutional rights.  
III. THE REAL ISSUE WITH NO REFUSAL 
The Schmerber decision prompted the Louisiana Legislature, 
like many state governments, to enact implied consent statutes.138 
Implied consent is a legal fiction, resting on the notion that driving 
is a privilege and not a right.139 Implied consent assumes that in 
return for the ability to drive, every motorist agrees to a BAT when 
                                                                                                             
 
filiation. The State’s interest in preserving an individual’s constitutional right to 
inherit through forced heirship or an individual’s compelling interest in 
determining his heritage overrides the slight privacy invasion involved in a 
blood test. See Succession of Robinson, 654 So. 2d 682 (La. 1995); Sudwisher 
v. Estate of Hoffpauir, 589 So. 2d 474 (La. 1991). 
 133. See, e.g., Pierre, 606 So. 2d at 816.  
 134. Id.  
 135. LA. CONST. art. I, § 16.  
 136. Pierre, 606 So. 2d at 818.  
 137. Id.  
 138. See generally Gulbis, supra note 5. New York became the first state to 
enact an implied consent law in 1953. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1194(2) 
(McKinney 2010). Slowly, other states began to follow suit by passing their own 
version of New York’s statute. Today, some statutory regime of implied consent 
exists in every state. See John Hoffman, Implied Consent with a Twist: Adding 
Blood to New Jersey’s Implied Consent Law and Criminalizing Refusal Where 
Drinking and Driving Results in Death or Serious Injury, 35 RUTGERS L. J. 345, 
356 (2003); Donna J. Arnold, Legislation—Implied Consent Legislation in 
Drunk Driving Cases: The Case for Repeal—People v. Moselle, People v. 
Daniel, People v. Wolter, 6. W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 465, 465–66 (1983). 
 139. Arnold, supra note 138, at 465–66.  
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an officer has probable cause to suspect the motorist of driving 
while intoxicated.140 Unlike true consent, implied consent 
presupposes the motorist’s agreement as a condition for receiving a 
driver’s license, regardless of whether he affirmatively authorizes 
the test at the time of the stop.141 Because the State simply infers 
the driver’s consent, the driver can refuse the test and effectively 
withdraw his or her consent. Nevertheless, driving is a privilege 
over which the State can exert reasonable control to protect 
innocent bystanders.142 For this reason, the State imposes penalties 
for BAT refusal, including the revocation of a motorist’s driver’s 
license.143  
Scholars argue that implied consent laws are an example of 
how state legislatures have broadened the Schmerber baseline for 
the protection of individual rights.144 Although, state legislatures 
initially enacted these laws to enhance the utility of new BAT 
technology by using it to rid the streets of dangerous, irresponsible 
drivers.145 Implied consent laws were meant to act as a “powerful 
weapon” against impaired driving by enabling the State to gather 
BAT results, which usually guarantee a DWI conviction.146 States 
hoped that by increasing the likelihood of conviction, these laws 
would correspondingly increase DWI deterrence.147   
Yet, implied consent laws have proven unsuccessful due to the 
high rate of drivers who decline BATs and subsequently challenge 
their license suspension in court.148 Refusal is so common because 
DWI arrestees would rather face relatively short license 
suspensions than suffer the more serious consequences of DWI 
convictions.149 This failure of implied consent laws has led states 
like Louisiana to implement no-refusal search warrant policies to 
                                                                                                             
 140. Id.  
 141. Id. See also Hoffman, supra note 138, at 356.  
 142. See Arnold, supra note 138, at 465–66. 
 143. Id.  
 144. See Cook, supra note 2, at 92. 
 145. Hoffman, supra note 138, at 396. See also Hinte, supra note 6, at 162.  
 146. See Cafaro, supra note 5, at 100, 112 (“The result of the BAC test is an 
extremely valuable piece of evidence in an impaired driving case. If an impaired 
driver refuses a breath test, convincing a jury of a motorist’s guilt becomes even 
more difficult. . . . ‘[When] a person refuses the BAC test, that person is more 
likely to contest the case. The lack of BAC test results clouds the case just 
enough to give the defense an advantage it does not have when there are test 
results. Defense attorneys usually attack the police reports and the behavioral 
cues reported by the officer or trooper. Without a BAC test, these reported cues 
are the only evidence the State has of the person's intoxication at the time of 
arrest.’” (citations omitted)).  
 147. Id. at 112. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 32:661–70 (2002 & Supp. 2012).  
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obtain BAC evidence when officers cannot procure test results 
through implied consent.150 All 50 states now agree that implied 
consent is a necessary state restriction on an individual’s driving 
privilege because of the government’s need to prevent alcohol-
impaired driving.151 But in light of no refusal, states do not 
interpret their respective implied consent laws in the same way.152  
As a result, courts around the country are divided on whether 
the statutory ability to refuse under state law precludes officers 
from securing search warrants for blood evidence.153 Some courts 
side with opponents of no refusal, holding that citizens enjoy a 
“right to refuse” under the plain wording of the state’s implied 
consent law.154 Therefore, if a driver exercises his “refusal right,” 
the State’s only recourse is to punish him for declining the BAT in 
accordance with the statute; the police cannot use a search warrant 
to circumvent the statute’s unambiguous language.155 But courts in 
other states have sanctioned no-refusal search warrants, reasoning 
that the implied consent law neither forbids other constitutional 
search measures nor grants DWI suspects more rights than the 
Fourth Amendment.156  
Despite recent litigation involving DWI search warrants, the 
Louisiana Legislature has not specifically indicated that the 
implied consent statute provides greater rights to DWI suspects 
than the Fourth Amendment. Neither have Louisiana courts ruled 
that the Legislature enacted the implied consent law to expand 
protections beyond Schmerber.157 Thus, the validity of no refusal 
presents a question of legislative intent—specifically, whether 
Louisiana’s implied consent statute affords individuals greater 
liberties than the federal and state constitutions. Should courts 
decide that motorists enjoy a greater statutory “right to refuse,” 
then Louisiana’s implied consent law will invalidate no-refusal 
                                                                                                             
 150. See LeBlanc, supra note 14.  
 151. Elizabeth Rubin, Trying to Be Reasonable About Drunk Driving: 
Individualized Suspicion and the Fourth Amendment, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 1105, 
1105–06 (1994).  
 152. See Cook, supra note 2, at 106–08; see also Black, supra note 4, at 
771–72.  
 153. See, e.g., Sosa v. State, 4 P.3d 951 (Alaska 2000); State v. DiStefano, 
764 A.2d 1156 (R.I. 2000); Brown v. State, 774 N.E.2d 1001 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2002); Beeman v. Texas, 86 S.W.3d 613 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (en banc); 
State v. Zielke, 403 N.W.2d 427 (Wis. 1987).  
 154. See State v. Collier, 612 S.E.2d 281, 283 (Ga. 2005). 
 155. Id. See, e.g., Sosa, 4 P.3d 951; DiStefano, 764 A.2d 1156; Combs v. 
Commonwealth, 965 S.W.2d 161 (Ky. 1998).  
 156. See, e.g., Beeman, 86 S.W.3d 613; Brown, 774 N.E.2d 1001; Zielke, 403 
N.W. 2d 427.  
 157. See supra note 29. 
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programs and prevent the State from proceeding with the warrant 
process in DWI cases.  
IV. IMPLIED CONSENT AND THE “RIGHT TO REFUSE” 
A. Louisiana’s Implied Consent Law158 
The Louisiana Legislature passed its first implied consent 
statute in 1968.159 Like its counterparts in other states, Louisiana’s 
law provides that an individual “who operates a motor vehicle 
upon the public highways of this state shall be deemed to have 
given consent . . . to a chemical test or tests of his blood, breath, 
urine, or other bodily substance.”160 While this legal scheme 
allows officers to conduct BATs based on probable cause and DWI 
suspects’ implied consent, Louisiana Revised Statutes section 
32:666 simultaneously authorizes the accused to refuse the 
officer’s BAT request.161 Refusal, however, is not without 
consequence.162 Before requesting that the driver submit to a BAT, 
                                                                                                             
 158. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 32:661–70 (2002 & Supp. 2012). 
 159. See id.  
 160. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:661 (Supp. 2012). Under Louisiana Revised 
Statutes section 32:664, “only a physician, physician assistant, registered nurse, 
emergency medical technician, chemist, nurse practitioner, or other qualified 
technician” can perform the blood extraction for chemical analysis. Id. § 32:664. 
The statute prevents a law enforcement officer from taking blood samples 
pursuant to implied consent unless the officer is also a qualified physician or 
medical technician. Id. However, section 32:664 does not apply in a case where 
a suspect refuses an implied consent test and officers then obtain a search 
warrant for his blood. The statute clearly operates “[w]hen a person submits to a 
blood test at the request of a law enforcement officer under the provisions of this 
Part.” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the qualified technician requirement only 
applies to an implied consent search under Title 32. The only requirement for a 
warrant-based blood draw is that it be done in a “reasonable manner.” See, e.g., 
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 768 (1966).  
 161. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:666 (Westlaw 2012). This statute was 
amended in the 2012 Louisiana legislative session to state: 
The officer may direct a person to submit to a breath test, and if 
indicated, an additional blood test for the purpose of testing for the 
presence of alcohol, abused substances, and controlled dangerous 
substances. A refusal of any such test or tests shall result in the 
suspension of driving privileges as provided by the provisions of this 
Part.  
Act of June 7, 2012, 2012 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act No. 592 (H.B. 781) (West). 
 162. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:666. Refusal results in the seizure of the 
suspect’s driver’s license and, ultimately, the revocation of his driving 
privileges. Id. Moreover, evidence of the suspect’s refusal “shall be admissible 
in any criminal action or proceeding arising out of acts alleged to have been 
committed while the person” was driving under the influence of drugs or 
alcohol. Id.  
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the officer must read a suspect his Miranda rights and inform him 
of the penalties for refusal, as well as the implications of chemical 
test results indicating a BAC at or above the legal limit.163 Yet, 
even if the suspect refuses, the statute includes two exceptions for 
refusal that allow an officer to draw blood over the suspect’s 
objection in some circumstances.164 A suspect cannot decline a 
BAT if he refused on two prior occasions or if he was involved in a 
motor vehicle accident that results in death or serious bodily 
injury.165  
B. You Have the Right to Remain Silent, but Do You Have the 
“Right to Refuse?”  
Louisiana judges, administrators, and members of the public 
have come to believe that motorists enjoy a “right to refuse” DWI 
chemical tests under Louisiana’s implied consent law.166 
Opponents of no refusal argue that because the Louisiana 
Legislature affords drivers this “right to refuse,” the implied 
consent statute restricts the State from conducting a warrant-based 
search when a suspect exercises this statutory “right.”167 Even the 
                                                                                                             
 163. Under Louisiana Revised Statutes section 14:98(A)(1)(a), a test result of 
0.08% or more creates a presumption of intoxication. But under Louisiana 
Revised Statutes section 14:98(A)(1)(b), a test result of 0.08% or more is an 
element of the offense of driving while intoxicated. See State v. Broussard, 517 
So. 2d 1000, 1002 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (“The .10 percent or above reading 
constitutes a violation of LSA-R.S. 14:98, not just a rebuttable presumption.” 
(citing State v. Singer, 457 So. 2d 690 (La. Ct. App. 1984))).  
 164. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:666. 
 165. Id. The statutory definition of serious bodily injury includes “bodily 
injury which involves unconsciousness, protracted and obvious disfigurement, 
or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or 
mental faculty, or a substantial risk of death.” Id.  
 166. See, e.g., State v. Alcazar, 784 So. 2d 1276, 1281–82 & n.4 (La. 2001) 
(“[T]his refusal right is a matter of grace that the Louisiana Legislature has 
bestowed. . . . [T]his right of refusal would be hollow if we were to allow the 
introduction of the test results even if the police advise the defendant of his right 
to refuse . . . Notwithstanding, a defendant’s exercise of that right to refuse the 
chemical test is not without its consequences.” (emphasis added)); State v. 
Mobley, KW 11-00146 (La. Ct. App. 2011) (Genovese, J. dissenting); La. Att’y 
Gen. Op. No. 90-254 at 2 (Aug. 15, 1990) (referring to the implied consent statute 
as providing “the right to refuse to take a blood test” (emphasis added)); Chase 
Tettleton, Louisiana’s Drunk Driving “No Refusal” Initiative is Problematic, THE 
BABCOCK BLOG (Sept. 14, 2010), http://www.babcockpartners.com/blog/chase 
tettleton/2010/09/14/louisianas-drunk-driving-no-refusal-initiative-problematic 
(“In my opinion, Louisiana law allows drivers the right to refuse to a chemical test 
when accused of a DWI.”).  
 167. See, e.g., Cook, supra note 2, at 112–16.  
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Louisiana Supreme Court has referred to the 32:666 provision as 
conferring a “refusal right.”168  
Nonetheless, the Louisiana Supreme Court clearly indicated 
that an intoxicated driver’s ability to refuse a BAT is not a 
fundamental constitutional right.169 By describing it as a legislative 
“matter of grace” the court distinguished the “refusal right” as less 
than a true entitlement, indicating that DWI suspects are not 
inherently free to prevent the search for blood evidence under all 
circumstances.170 Therefore, those who argue that drivers enjoy a 
“right to refuse” BATs misinterpret the refusal stipulation.171 In 
fact, the text of the implied consent and search warrant statutes 
contradict the idea of a “refusal right” for three reasons: (1) the 
plain text of the implied consent statute does not restrict the State’s 
search capabilities; (2) the implied consent statute imposes 
penalties and exceptions for refusal; and (3) the search warrant 
statutes do not contain an exception for implied consent cases.  
1. Narrow Application of Refusal  
The clear wording of the implied consent statute does not 
constrain the State’s ability to search by granting DWI suspects the 
“right to refuse.” While Louisiana Revised Statutes section 32:661 
implies a driver’s consent to a warrantless BAT, a driver can 
withdraw his implied consent through refusal.172 But during a no-
refusal stop, the driver’s withdrawn consent triggers the search 
warrant process.173 Therefore, officers can continue the DWI blood 
draw under the authority of a valid warrant. Interpreting 
Louisiana’s implied consent regime to afford motorists an absolute 
right to decline a BAT would severely restrict the State’s search 
capabilities, when in truth, implied consent expands the State’s 
methods for procuring criminal evidence.174  
Implied consent gives the State another predicate for a valid 
DWI search, as consent is an exception to the State’s requirement 
to obtain a search warrant.175 Pursuant to the implied consent 
                                                                                                             
 168. Alcazar, 784 So. 2d at 1281–82.  
 169. Id.  
 170. Id. at 1281 (emphasis added). In the legal sense, act of grace means an 
“act of clemency,” or a matter of kindness and leniency. BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 39 (9th ed. 2009). 
 171. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:666 (Westlaw 2012). 
 172. Id. See also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:662 (2002). 
 173. See, e.g., Shannon, supra note 14.  
 174. Beeman v. Texas, 86 S.W.3d 613, 616 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (en banc).  
 175. State v. Angel, 356 So. 2d 986, 988–89 (La. 1978) (“A valid consent to 
search is a well recognized exception to the requirement of a valid search 
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statute, a driver invokes this consent exception by signing his 
license application and agreeing to a future warrantless blood 
search.176 The statute does not implicate actual consent by 
compelling the suspect’s affirmative agreement. Instead, the statute 
triggers the consent exception by invoking a driver’s previous 
assent in contracting for a license at the time of the DWI stop.177 
Accordingly, the statute legalizes a warrantless blood draw, 
allowing officers to rely on assumed consent as a predicate for the 
search without taking extra time and effort to first obtain a 
warrant.178 Of course, a suspect’s refusal will ultimately prevent 
the State from utilizing the implied consent exception as 
justification for the warrantless BAT.179  
Still, BAT refusal has a narrow application. “[T]he Legislature 
created a very limited exception in La. R.S. §§ 32:661(C)(1) and 
32:666(A) which allows the defendant to refuse to permit the State 
to gather physical evidence against him” only when the officer 
does not secure a warrant.180 Thus, implied consent merely justifies 
a warrantless DWI search for blood evidence. Consent is not 
necessary for a search to be valid, and a suspect’s consent, whether 
                                                                                                             
 
warrant; a search pursuant to a voluntary consent need not be based on probable 
cause.” (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973))).  
The Declaration of Intent on the Louisiana Department of Motor Vehicle’s 
driver’s license application reads as follows:  
By my signature affixed below, I certify under penalty of law, that . . . I 
hereby give my consent, under the provisions of R.S. 32:661 et. seq., to 
take a chemical test to determine the presence of alcohol or a controlled 
dangerous substance in my blood while operating a motor vehicle, if 
requested to do so by a law enforcement officer. 
Office of Motor Vehicles, La. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr., Application for 
License or Identification Card, http://dpsweb.dps.louisiana.gov/DPSForms.nsf 
(follow “Driver’s License” hyperlink; then follow “Application For DL/ID 
Card” hyperlink). The applicant must sign and date the form in the space 
provided below the declaration.   
 176. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:666; see also discussion supra Part 
III.B–C.  
 177. Beeman, 86 S.W.3d at 615.  
 178. Id. at 616.  
 179. When a suspect refuses, he revokes his consent to the search, which he 
gave at the time of his license application. An officer cannot proceed with an 
implied consent BAT pursuant to the statute because it only authorizes a 
warrantless search if the suspect has not refused and the refusal exceptions do 
not apply. 
 180. State v. Alcazar, 784 So. 2d 1276, 1277 (La. 2001). If the Legislature 
intended to make refusal a right, rather than a permissive ability, it would not 
have included penalties and exceptions for refusal. See discussion infra Part 
III.D.2. Furthermore, the Legislature would have created exceptions in the 
warrant statutes for implied consent cases. See discussion infra Part III.D.3.  
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actual or implied, becomes irrelevant once a judge issues a 
warrant.181 Undoubtedly, the State can conduct a reasonable search 
subsequent to a suspect’s refusal by relying on a valid search 
warrant.182  
2. Statutory Penalties and Exceptions for Refusal  
Both the statutory penalties for refusal and the refusal 
exceptions further indicate that impaired motorists do not enjoy a 
“right to refuse” under Louisiana law. As the court in State v. 
Alcazar observed, “[A] defendant’s exercise of that right to refuse 
the chemical test is not without its consequences.”183 In contrast, 
true constitutional rights, like free speech and religion, do not 
stipulate penalties or repercussions for an individual who chooses 
to exercise those rights.184 Indeed, the Legislature would not have 
included penalties for refusal if it desired to create a true “right to 
refuse.”185 Rather than punishing motorists who decline a BAT, the 
legislature would protect this “right to refuse” from unnecessary 
government restriction, as it has done with other fundamental 
individual liberties.186  
Similarly, the Louisiana Legislature created an exception to 
refusal in the event of serious bodily injury or death.187 In Alcazar, 
                                                                                                             
 181. See, e.g., Beeman, 86 S.W.3d at 615–16; see also, e.g., State v. Wolfe, 
398 So. 2d 1117, 1120 (La. 1981). The Wolfe court held: “[N]o exigent 
circumstances existed that would permit the officers to dispense with the 
requirement of a search warrant. Hence . . . the warrantless search of 
defendant’s apartment was impermissible unless based upon defendant's 
consent.” Id. (emphasis added). Either consent or exigent circumstances were 
necessary to justify the search in this instance merely because the officers did 
not previously obtain a warrant. Id.  
 182. See, e.g., State v. Walker, 953 So. 2d 786, 790 (La. 2007) (“[A]bsent 
exigent circumstances or some other well-recognized exception such as consent, 
the police must obtain a warrant before they . . . intrude on an individual's 
reasonable and legitimate expectation of privacy.”); State v. Fontenot, 383 So. 
2d 365 (La. 1980) (invalidating the warrantless search of woman’s genital canal 
because woman did not consent and no exigent circumstances existed to waive 
the warrant requirement).  
 183. Alcazar, 784 So. 2d at 1281 n.4.  
 184. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. I; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 185. The Louisiana Supreme Court has acknowledged, “[S]tatutes using 
mandatory language prescribe the result to follow (a penalty) if the required 
action is not taken.” See, e.g., Marks v. New Orleans Police Dep’t, 943 So. 2d 
1028, 1035 (La. 2006). Based on this observation, consent to a BAC test is 
mandatory because the statute stipulates penalties for a suspect’s failure to 
submit to the BAC test. Refusal cannot be an absolute right when drivers 
suspected of DWI must submit to a chemical test.  
 186. See, e.g., LA. CONST. art. I.  
 187. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §32:666 (Westlaw 2012).  
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the court found that the facts did not trigger the refusal exceptions, 
so the “defendant had a right to refuse testing.”188 Explaining its 
analysis, the court remarked: “We observe that the right of refusal 
does not extend to a person under arrest for [driving while 
intoxicated] . . . ‘wherein a traffic fatality has occurred or a person 
has sustained serious bodily injury.’”189 These exceptions, like the 
statutory penalties, illustrate that the “right to refuse” is more akin 
to a privilege than an absolute entitlement. Certainly, if the “right 
to refuse” does not apply equally to all motorists, and a motorist 
must meet certain criteria before the statute affords him this right, 
courts should not classify refusal as an entitlement. Instead, the 
ability to refuse a BAT is much like the privilege of driving, for it 
is subject to governmental control and regulation.190  
3. Absence of Search Warrant Exemption  
Whereas the inclusion of refusal penalties and restrictions 
indicates the legislature’s unwillingness to create a true right, the 
exclusion of DWI exceptions in the search warrant statutes also 
demonstrates that individuals do not enjoy a “right to refuse.” 
Neither current laws nor jurisprudence give drivers immunity from 
warrant-based blood or urine searches.191 Therefore, the implied 
consent statute merely gives a DWI suspect the authority to 
withdraw his implied consent to the officer’s initial request for a 
warrantless search––it does not give him the “right to refuse” a 
warrant-based search.192  
To illustrate, article 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 
explains the property subject to search and seizure under a warrant 
and provides that “a judge may issue a warrant authorizing the 
search for and seizure of any thing . . . which . . . [m]ay constitute 
evidence tending to prove the commission of an offense.”193 Like 
every other state’s law, Louisiana’s law criminalizes the operation 
of a motor vehicle if the “operator’s blood alcohol concentration is 
0.08 percent or more by weight based on grams of alcohol per one 
hundred cubic centimeters of blood . . . .”194 In the case of an 
                                                                                                             
 188. Alcazar, 784 So. 2d at 1277 n.1.  
 189. Id. (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:666(A) (Westlaw 2012)).   
 190. See Arnold, supra note 138.  
 191. See, e.g., LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 161 (Supp. 2012); LA. CODE 
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 163.1 (Westlaw 2012), amended by Act of May 11, 2012, 
2012 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act No. 44 (H.B. 74) (West).  
 192. In fact, this may be considered an obstruction of a court order in 
violation of LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:133.1 (2004).   
 193. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 161.  
 194. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:98 (2012).  
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impaired-driving suspect, blood can “constitute evidence tending 
to prove the commission” of DWI by revealing a BAC above the 
legal limit.195 Blood may, in fact, be the most valuable evidence to 
prove a DWI crime because without BAC evidence, “supporting 
the impaired driving charge ‘is limited to an officer’s observations 
of the driver’s behavior on the road, visible signs of intoxication, 
and the driver’s scores on the Standardized Field Sobriety Tests 
(SFST),’” which are often subjective and unreliable.196 Moreover, 
the legislature amended the “property subject to seizure”197 article 
as recently as the 2011 first extraordinary session.198 At that time, 
the Louisiana Legislature could have easily created an exception 
for blood evidence under a no-refusal policy. However, it decided 
against statutorily exempting DWI blood evidence from the types 
of property subject to seizure under a search warrant. 
Additionally, Code of Criminal Procedure article 163.1, 
entitled “Search of a person for bodily samples,” specifies that “[a] 
judge may issue a search warrant authorizing the search of a 
person for bodily samples to obtain [DNA] or other bodily 
samples.”199 The Legislature amended and reenacted article 163.1 
in 2005, essentially approving the use of blood search warrants. 
The House Legislative Services digest, which summarizes the 
2005 legislation, explains that the law “adds an exception for the 
search of a person for bodily fluids.”200 By its plain meaning, 
“bodily fluids” includes blood. But like article 161, this statute 
contains no exception for implied consent cases. In other words, 
the Legislature refused to immunize DWI suspects from the 
search-warrant process. Consequently, motorists cannot disobey 
no-refusal warrants authorizing the search for BAC evidence. 
Lacking the ability to refuse all DWI blood searches, whether 
conducted with or without search warrants, motorists do not enjoy 
a true “right to refuse.”   
                                                                                                             
 195. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 161.  
 196. Hinte, supra note 6, at 164 (citations omitted). See also State v. Loisel, 
812 So. 2d 822, 825 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that under the facts, officers 
statements in report were not enough to sustain conviction, but observing that 
“[w]hether behavioral manifestations are sufficient to support a charge of 
driving while intoxicated must be determined on a case-by-case basis. . . . It is 
not necessary that a conviction of D.W.I. be based upon a blood or breath 
alcohol test, and the observations of an arresting officer may be sufficient to 
establish the defendant’s guilt.”); discussion infra Part V.C.  
 197. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 161.  
 198. 2011 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act No. 16 (H.B. 22) (West).  
 199. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 163.1 (Westlaw 2012), amended by 
Act of May 11, 2012, 2012 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act No. 44 (H.B. 74) (West).  
 200. La. B. Dig. Original, 2005 Reg. Sess. H.B. 106 (West) (emphasis added). 
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For these reasons, Louisiana’s implied consent statute clearly 
does not give DWI suspects a greater “refusal right” than the 
Fourth Amendment or the Louisiana Constitution. In actuality, 
refusal is a permissive privilege that allows the driver to decline a 
warrantless search, not a right to avoid even warrant-based 
searches. Even so, the statute’s plain wording or the policy goals 
behind its enactment may be inconsistent with a no-refusal policy. 
Unfortunately, the Louisiana Legislature is silent with respect to 
the statute’s purpose and has failed to adopt legislation regarding 
the legality of no refusal.201 Therefore, a final determination of no 
refusal’s validity rests primarily on an interpretation of the implied 
consent language and the Legislature’s intent in enacting this 
statutory scheme. 
V. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION OF IMPLIED CONSENT 
A. Plain Meaning Approach  
The first step in an interpretation of statutory language is to 
ascertain the statute’s plain meaning.202 According to the Louisiana 
Civil Code, “[l]egislation is a solemn expression of legislative 
will.”203 To give effect to the legislative will, “[w]hen a law is 
clear and unambiguous . . . the law shall be applied as written and 
no further interpretation may be made in search of the intent of the 
legislature.”204 
                                                                                                             
 201. In the 2011 regular legislative session, Representative Seabaugh 
proposed House Bill 119 to amend Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure 
article 163.1. In effect, this bill would have legalized no-refusal policies: “The 
warrant may be executed any place the person is found or at the location of the 
person authorized to draw bodily samples, and shall be directed to any peace 
officer who shall obtain and distribute the bodily samples as directed in the 
warrant.” Further, the legislation sought to immunize “the person who draws the 
sample” and his hospital or other employer. The House approved the bill in a 
vote of 94 to 0. Subsequently, the Senate referred H.B. 119 to the Judiciary C 
Committee and later to the Judiciary B Committee. However, the bill never 
reached the Senate floor for final passage. LOUISIANA STATE LEGISLATURE, 
http://www.legis.state.la.us/ (under “Bill Search,” select “2011 Regular Session” 
then select “HB”; type “119” in search box; follow “View” hyperlink; follow 
“Text – current” hyperlink; for procedural history of the bill, follow “History” 
hyperlink).  
 202. State v. Bell, 947 So. 2d 774, 778 (La. Ct. App. 2006) (“[T]he meaning 
of a law must first be sought in the language employed. If that is plain, it is the 
duty of the courts to enforce the law as written. Thus, interpretation of any 
statute begins with the language of the statute itself.”).  
 203. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2 (2011).  
 204. Id. art. 9.  
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1. Examples from Other States  
Courts in other states have examined the validity of no-refusal 
search warrants under their own implied consent laws using a plain 
meaning approach similar to that required by the Louisiana Civil 
Code.205 In Sosa v. State, for example, the Alaska Supreme Court 
found that its implied consent scheme was comprehensive and held 
that the statute provides the exclusive means for punishing BAT 
refusal.206 The officer in Sosa procured a search warrant 
authorizing the withdrawal of the defendant’s blood after the 
police breath-testing device malfunctioned.207 The State 
subsequently sued the defendant for his failure to comply with the 
search warrant.208 The court examined the Alaska implied consent 
statute, which provides that drivers impliedly consent to BATs in 
two limited cases.209 Because the statute contains no general 
language implying a driver’s consent in other circumstances, the 
law provides “the exclusive authority for the administration of 
police-initiated chemical sobriety tests.”210 Consequently, the court 
refused to punish the defendant for violating the warrant, as the 
only authority for penalizing BAT refusal exists in the implied 
consent statute.211 Without a no-refusal search warrant exception, 
the unambiguous statutory language barred the court from 
sanctioning him.212  
Likewise, the Rhode Island Supreme Court followed a plain 
meaning analysis in State v. Distefano. The court held that the 
statutory phrase––“[i]f a person having been placed under arrest 
refuses upon the request of a law enforcement officer to submit to 
the tests . . . none shall be given”––impedes a warrant-based BAT 
when a driver refuses the officer’s initial request.213 The Rhode 
Island Legislature established “an elaborate requirement of 
consent” but declined to create a statute authorizing the use of a 
                                                                                                             
 205. See, e.g., Sosa v. State, 4 P.3d 951, 955 (Alaska 2000); State v. Collier, 
612 S.E.2d 281, 283 (Ga. 2005); State v. Distefano, 764 A.2d 1156, 1161 (R.I. 
2000); see also LA. CIV. CODE art. 9 (2011).  
 206. Sosa, 4 P.3d at 955.  
 207. Id. at 952. 
 208. Id.  
 209. Id. at 953 (citing ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 28.35.031 (Westlaw 2012)) 
(when an accident causes death or serious injury and when the driver is 
“unconscious or otherwise . . . incapable of refusal”).  
 210. Id. at 954 (citing Pena v. State, 684 P.2d 864, 867 (Alaska 1984)).  
 211. Id. at 955.  
 212. Id.  
 213. State v. Distefano, 764 A.2d 1156, 1161 (R.I. 2000) (emphasis added) 
(citing R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 31-27-2.1 (Westlaw 2012)).  
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BAT warrant upon a driver’s refusal.214 Accordingly, the court 
reasoned that the plain statutory wording expressly prohibits no-
refusal search warrants.  
In contrast, the Texas Criminal Court of Appeals rejected a 
plain meaning analysis “by allowing the forced compulsion of 
blood evidence in every DWI arrest when the statute specifically 
states that a person arrested for DWI may refuse such a request.”215 
The Beeman v. Texas court concluded that a search warrant is 
another way officers can conduct a constitutionally valid search in 
addition to implied consent, even though the statute specifies: “[A] 
specimen may not be taken if a person refuses to submit to the 
taking of a specimen designated by a peace officer.”216 The 
Beeman defendant argued that the statute expressly forbade the 
State from taking a suspect’s blood after he declined a BAT unless 
the statutory injury-exception applied.217 Because the statute 
contains a specific exception for car-crash injuries and lacks a 
similar search-warrant concession, the law implicitly prohibits no-
refusal searches.218 For this reason, the defendant argued, the State 
cannot violate the unambiguous language by conducting a warrant-
based BAT.219 The Texas court refused to accept this textual 
interpretation and ruled instead that the suspect’s consent to a 
warrant-based blood draw is irrelevant.220 Moreover, the court held 
that the Texas implied consent statute does not afford greater 
protection to DWI suspects than the Fourth Amendment.221  
2. Louisiana Application  
Like the Alaska, Rhode Island, and Texas statutes, Louisiana’s 
implied consent law provides a framework for the warrantless 
withdrawal of a DWI suspect’s blood.222 And while these examples 
highlight important considerations for a proper interpretation of 
implied consent, the plain language of Louisiana’s implied consent 
scheme is distinguishable in two primary ways: first, the statutory 
                                                                                                             
 214. Id. at 1169. 
 215. Cook, supra note 2, at 111.  
 216. TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 724.013 (West 2011) (emphasis added). See 
also Beeman v. Texas, 86 S.W.3d 613, 615 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (en banc).  
 217. Beeman, 86 S.W.3d at 615 (citing TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 724.011-
.013). The defendant relied on the implied consent provision that orders officers 
to take a suspect’s blood, even if he refuses, when the suspect is involved in a 
motor vehicle accident causing serious injury. Id.  
 218. Id.  
 219. Id.  
 220. Id.  
 221. Id. at 617.  
 222. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 32:661–670 (2002 & Supp. 2012).  
2012] COMMENT 283 
 
 
 
text does not bar the State from conducting a BAT by other means; 
second, the statutory text clearly permits the introduction of 
intoxication evidence other than implied consent BAT results.  
a. Absence of Statutory Preclusion  
Nothing on the face of Louisiana’s “refusal to submit” 
provision inhibits an officer from obtaining blood evidence 
pursuant to a warrant like the “none shall be given” phrase in 
Rhode Island’s implied consent law.223 Such language appears to 
preclude the search warrant process when a suspect withdraws his 
implied consent.224 Unlike Rhode Island’s implied consent statute, 
Louisiana’s law does not contain this preclusive phrasing.225 A 
plain reading of Louisiana’s statute does not indicate any search 
warrant restrictions that a court could use to invalidate the no-
refusal process without such a provision.  
The plain language of Louisiana’s law actually sanctions no 
refusal when: (1) a suspect previously refused to submit to a BAC 
test in two separate DWI stops; or (2) a motor vehicle accident 
caused a fatality or serious bodily injury.226 One might argue, like 
the Beeman defendant, that the statute renders a no-refusal blood 
draw valid, but only under the limited statutory exceptions.227 The 
Louisiana Legislature specifically created two refusal exemptions, 
so, by implication, the statute clearly excludes a BAT over a 
suspect’s objection in other circumstances.228 Correspondingly, a 
warrant-based BAT obtained pursuant to no refusal goes beyond 
the law’s explicit text and violates the rule. This argument rests on 
the assumption that the Beeman majority did not follow the plain 
                                                                                                             
 223. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:666 (Westlaw 2012); State v. Distefano, 
764 A.2d 1156, 1161 (R.I. 2000). 
 224. See, e.g., Distefano, 764 A.2d at 1161. 
 225. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 32:661–670. 
 226. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:666.  
 227. See generally Beeman v. Texas, 86 S.W.3d 613 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) 
(en banc). 
 228. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius is the Latin maxim and canon of 
statutory construction meaning “the inclusion of one implies the exclusion of 
another.” See State v. La. Riverboat Gaming Comm’n, 655 So. 2d 292, 302 (La. 
1995) (“[S]ettled rule of statutory construction that the mention of one thing in a 
statute implies the exclusion of another thing. This time-honored maxim, the 
doctrine of Expressio Unius est Exclusio Alterius, dictates that when the 
legislature specifically enumerates a series of things, such as the Division’s 
enumerated powers in this case, the legislature’s omission of other items, which 
could have easily been included in the statute is deemed intentional.”). Based on 
this principle of reasoning, the inclusion of statutory no-refusal exceptions 
implies the exclusion, and thus prohibition, of others.  
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meaning approach when it upheld a warrant-based BAT despite a 
refusal exception similar to that in Louisiana’s statue.229 Thus, 
Louisiana courts can easily distinguish this result, since the Civil 
Code requires adherence to a statute’s plain meaning.230   
While this reasoning is persuasive, it fails to account for the 
significant may not be taken language in the Texas statute.231 
Admittedly, the Texas court did circumvent this obvious statuary 
mandate by authorizing no-refusal search warrants—may not be 
taken clearly bans an officer from taking a blood-specimen upon 
refusal.232 But in contrast, Louisiana’s implied consent law lacks 
an equivalent limitation such as may not be taken.233 Even 
considering the refusal exceptions, a plain reading of Louisiana’s 
law actually supports the result in Beeman, since the statute does 
not impose such an unequivocal prohibition on the State’s search 
capabilities.  
On its face, Louisiana’s law does not appear to restrict the no-
refusal warrant process, and following this plain meaning 
approach, Louisiana courts should uphold no-refusal search 
warrants. Still, if the law contained a similar restriction, no test 
shall be given or may not be taken language would only forbid 
officers from continuing a warrantless search pursuant to the 
implied consent statute.234 Quite simply, unless the statute 
expressly excludes DWI search warrants, the withdrawal of 
implied consent and the implied consent statute itself have no 
applicability to warrant-based searches.   
b. Implied Consent Law Is Not the Exclusive Authority for DWI 
Searches  
Conversely, the lack of a preclusive phrase does not destroy the 
case against no refusal. Opponents of the policy could cite the 
Alaska Supreme Court, which held that its implied consent law 
forbids DWI search warrants despite the lack of a specific ban, 
such as upon refusal, no test shall be given.235 The Sosa court 
based this conclusion on the fact that the implied consent statute is 
comprehensive, furnishing the “exclusive authority for the 
administration of police-initiated chemical sobriety tests to a driver 
                                                                                                             
 229. See generally Cook, supra note 2.  
 230. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 9 (2011).  
 231. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 724.013 (West 2011). 
 232. Beeman v. Texas, 86 S.W.3d 613, 616–17 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (en 
banc).  
 233. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:666 (Westlaw 2012). 
 234. See City of Seattle v. St. John, 215 P.3d 194, 197 (Wash. 2009).  
 235. See Sosa v. State, 4 P.3d 951, 953–55 (Alaska 2000).  
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arrested for acts allegedly committed while operating a motor 
vehicle.”236  
Louisiana’s implied consent law, on the other hand, is not the 
exclusive source for BAC evidence. The statutory text states that 
the law “shall not be construed as limiting the introduction of any 
other competent evidence” regarding whether the suspect was 
driving while intoxicated.237 Unlike Alaska’s law, the plain 
language of Louisiana’s implied consent statute does not bar no-
refusal search warrants. As these distinctions suggest, a plain 
meaning analysis of Louisiana’s implied consent law supports the 
use of no-refusal search warrants. The statute also presents a 
possibility for conflicting interpretations.  
B. Examining Legislative Intent 
When the plain language of a statute is unclear or “susceptible 
of different meanings, it must be interpreted as having the meaning 
that best conforms to the purpose of the law.”238 The interpretation 
of ambiguous legislation should honor the overriding legislative 
objectives in passing the law,239 as legislation is the “solemn 
expression of legislative will.”240 
1. Potential for Ambiguous Interpretations 
The clear text of Louisiana’s implied consent law does not 
forbid no-refusal search warrants.241 Though perhaps more 
importantly, the statute does not explicitly authorize the use of a 
DWI warrant when the suspect declines a BAT.242 The 
Legislature’s failure to include a specific no-refusal warrant 
exception creates a possibility for contradictory interpretations 
about the policy’s validity, leading no-refusal challengers to argue 
that the statute’s plain meaning is ambiguous with respect to the 
legality of DWI search warrants.  
A comparison of Louisiana’s implied consent regime to similar 
statutes in other states demonstrates this potential for ambiguity.243 
The Supreme Court of Washington held that its state legislature did 
not intend to preclude warrant-based BAT under Washington’s 
                                                                                                             
 236. Id. at 954 (citing Pena v. State, 684 P.2d 864, 867 (Alaska 1984)).  
 237. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:662 (2002).  
 238. LA. CIV. CODE art. 10 (2011).  
 239. See, e.g., id. art. 9 (2011).  
 240. Id. art. 2.  
 241. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 32:661–70 (2002 & Supp. 2012).  
 242. Id.  
 243. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 46.20.308 (Westlaw 2012). 
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implied consent law.244 The Washington Legislature explicitly laid 
out its policy regarding warrant-based searches for DWI evidence 
in the implied consent text: “Neither consent nor this section 
precludes a police officer from obtaining a search warrant for a 
person’s breath or blood.”245  
Comparatively, Louisiana’s implied consent law does not 
include a similar provision clearly demonstrating a legislative 
intent to allow warrant-based searches.246 Louisiana Revised 
Statutes section 32:662, however, does evidence the government’s 
desire to enlarge the scope of the State’s DWI search tactics.247 
Nonetheless, the wording of Revised Statutes section 32:662 can 
be misleading. A plain reading of section 32:662’s language 
indicates that the law supports the admission of “other competent 
evidence” regarding the suspect’s condition.248 More specifically, 
Louisiana courts have found that an arresting officer’s observations 
can be sufficient to prove a DWI suspect’s guilt.249 Interpreting the 
section 32:662 provision, the Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. 
Allen remarked: “[I]ntoxication, with its attendant behavioral 
manifestations, is an observable condition about which a witness 
may testify.”250  
Clearly, the implied consent provisions authorize other types of 
evidence, like sensory observations of a suspect’s behavior and 
demeanor as well as field sobriety test results.251 But does the 
statute acknowledge other competent means for obtaining the same 
type of evidence? In other words, does this provision allow BAT 
test results from a source other than the implied consent statute? 
The Allen court did not answer this question, focusing instead on 
the admissibility of a suspect’s “behavioral manifestations, 
                                                                                                             
 244. City of Seattle v. St. John, 215 P.3d 194, 197 (Wash. 2009).  
 245. Id.  
 246. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 32:661–70. 
 247. The Louisiana Legislature specified that the implied consent law “shall 
not be construed as limiting the introduction of any other competent evidence 
bearing upon the question whether the person was under the influence of 
alcoholic beverages or any . . . controlled dangerous substance.” LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 32:662 (2002). 
 248. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 32:661–70. 
 249. State v. Allen, 440 So. 2d 1330, 1334 (La. 1983) (citing State v. Spence, 
418 So. 2d 583, 589 (La. 1982)). 
 250. Id. See also State v. Wiltcher, 956 So. 2d. 769, 773 (La. Ct. App. 2007) 
(finding officers observations sufficient to establish guilt of DWI because 
defense cross-examined officer extensively about potential inaccuracies in field 
sobriety testing). 
 251. State v. Loisel, 812 So. 2d 822, 825 (La. Ct. App. 2002).  
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independent of any scientific test.”252 Moreover, the Louisiana 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal did not even regard BAC proof as 
essential for the State to secure a DWI conviction.253  
This ambiguity creates the possibility for multiple 
interpretations of Revised Statutes section 32:662. Under a narrow 
reading, the State can introduce other types of evidence—i.e., 
nonscientific evidence—in addition to implied consent BAT 
results. Such a construction, however, would only authorize 
evidence relating to the suspect’s behavior and demeanor. In 
effect, section 32:662 would limit the introduction of BAT results 
to those based on an implied consent search or a search pursuant to 
a statutory refusal exception. On the other hand, a broad 
application of this provision would allow the state to introduce any 
“competent evidence bearing upon the question whether the person 
was under the influence of alcoholic beverages.”254 A broad 
reading would permit the use of warrant-based BAT evidence, 
therefore allowing the State to introduce the same type of 
evidence––BAT results––from mechanisms other than implied 
consent. 
Revised Statutes section 32:662, by implication, appears to 
sanction the use of alternative means for gathering evidence.255 
Still, Revised Statutes section 32:662 does not specifically 
acknowledge the use of additional search methods to gather “other 
competent” BAT evidence in lieu of implied consent.256 In fact, 
nowhere in the entire statutory scheme does the Louisiana 
Legislature directly reference search warrants or other 
constitutional search procedures. The exclusion of a statutory 
warrant reference could indicate a legislative intent to preclude no-
refusal warrants. However, the absence of a warrant provision 
similar to Washington’s does not destroy the case for no refusal. 
                                                                                                             
 252. Id. at 825. See also id. at 824–26 (examining defendant’s balance, smell 
of alcohol on breath, slurred speech, misunderstanding of instructions, and other 
visual observations of behavior in probable cause determination).  
 253. Id. at 824–26. 
 254. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:662(B) (2002). 
 255. See discussion supra Part IV.A.3; see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:662 
(2002) (“The provisions of Subsection A of this section shall not be construed as 
limiting the introduction of any other competent evidence bearing upon the 
question whether the person was under the influence of alcoholic beverages or any 
abused substance or controlled dangerous substance.”). Since the statute allows for 
“other competent evidence,” it clearly must also allow other competent means for 
obtaining evidence. Otherwise, this provision is useless. Officers will be unable to 
gather other evidence if the statute precludes all other evidence-gathering 
measures because the implied consent provision only applies to BAT results.  
 256. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:662. 
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2. Examples from Other States 
In examining the legislative intent of implied consent, several 
state courts have upheld the use of BAT search warrants because 
they further the legislation’s ultimate purpose. The Washington 
court based its conclusion primarily on the clear communication of 
legislative will to keep the search warrant process alive.257 
Importantly, however, the court also recognized that even if the 
statute did not include the warrant reference, DWI search warrants 
would still be valid under the implied consent law.258 To prove this 
point, the Washington court analyzed the statute’s purpose.259 The 
court found that the legislative goals of implied consent include: 
“(1) discouraging DUI, (2) removing driving privileges from those 
individuals disposed to DUI, and (3) providing an efficient means of 
gathering reliable evidence of intoxication.”260 Surely, a finding 
against no refusal would frustrate these goals by preventing officers 
from using DWI search warrants. In practice, the implied consent 
law would actually decrease the State’s capability of gathering 
intoxication evidence, which, in turn, would decrease the deterrent 
force of DWI conviction.261 Therefore, the court held that the 
statute’s purpose also validates BAT search warrants.262 
The Indiana Court of Appeals reached a similar result when it 
engaged in its own assessment of legislative intent.263 Resembling 
the Louisiana implied consent legislation, Indiana’s statute lacks the 
direct warrant reference contained in the Washington law; though, 
the appellate court’s scrutiny revealed no legislative intent to 
prevent the State from seeking a search warrant.264 Such a 
prohibition “once a driver has refused to consent to a chemical test 
would be inconsistent with the implied consent law’s underlying 
goal of protecting the public from the threat posed by the presence 
of drunk drivers on the highway.”265  
Correspondingly, the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s analysis 
indicated a legislative purpose of enhancing the State’s ability to 
                                                                                                             
 257. See City of Seattle v. St. John, 215 P.3d 194, 197 (Wash. 2009).  
 258. Id.  
 259. Id.  
 260. Id. (citing Dep’t of Licensing v. Lax, 888 P.2d 1190, 1193 (Wash. 1995) 
(en banc)).   
 261. Id. at 197–98.  
 262. Id. at 198.  
 263. Brown v. State, 774 N.E.2d 1001, 1003–04 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).  
 264. Id. at 1007. 
 265. Id. The court also distinguished its decision from contradictory rulings in 
other states by emphasizing the statute’s lack of a “no test shall be given” phrase. 
Id. The court construed the absence of this wording as evidence of the legislature’s 
desire to permit search warrants under the statute. Id.  
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collect DWI evidence in furtherance of its ultimate goal of deterring 
driving while intoxicated.266 The Wisconsin Legislature, however, 
did not pass the implied consent scheme “to give greater fourth 
amendment [sic] rights to an alleged drunk driver than those 
afforded any other criminal defendant.”267 Furthermore, 
Wisconsin’s statute did not create a new ground for excluding 
evidence of intoxication.268 The government established implied 
consent as an additional search tool in DWI cases.269 And to satisfy 
this function, the court proposed, Washington’s implied consent law 
cannot prevent other constitutional search measures like no-refusal 
warrants.270  
3. Louisiana Application  
State courts recognize that the Louisiana Legislature has similar 
goals for its own implied consent regime, which include increasing 
highway safety and expanding the State’s search capabilities.271 
Following the lead of states like Washington, Indiana, and 
Wisconsin, Louisiana courts must resolve questions about no 
refusal’s legality with an answer that promotes this legislative 
will.272 
a. Promoting Highway Safety  
In Price v. Department of Public Safety, the Louisiana Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeal rejected an attack on the constitutionality of 
the implied consent statute by stating the purpose of the law: “The 
implied consent law was enacted for a legitimate government 
purpose; i.e., to promote public safety on Louisiana highways.”273 
No refusal likewise advances the goal of highway safety by curbing 
increasing refusal rates, which presently thwart the State’s ability to 
perform BATs and reduce the deterrent force of implied consent.274   
                                                                                                             
 266. State v. Zielke, 403 N.W.2d 427, 428 (Wis. 1987).  
 267. Id.  
 268. Id. at 434.  
 269. Id.  
 270. Id.  
 271. See, e.g., State v. Allen, 440 So. 2d 1330, 1334 (La. 1983); Price v. Dep’t 
of Pub. Safety, 580 So. 2d 503, 505 (La. Ct. App. 1991).  
 272. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 10 (2011).  
 273. Price, 580 So. 2d at 505.  
 274. See LeBlanc, supra note 14. In Jefferson Parish, a no-refusal period 
during the 2010 Memorial Day weekend resulted in only one refusal, whereas that 
same weekend the year before, 16 drivers refused a BAC test. Id. Furthermore, 
officials in Rapides Parish implemented a permanent no-refusal policy in 2007, 
and in two years, the DWI refusal rate dropped from 35% to nearly zero. Id.  
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No refusal deters impaired driving by scaring motorists into 
BAT submission “even before the actual warrant is issued.”275 With 
a no-refusal program in place, motorists can no longer avoid DWI 
punishment by refusing a BAT. No refusal also enhances the 
statute’s effectiveness, as officers can conduct a warrantless search 
based on implied consent when a suspect submits prior to the 
warrant authorization. Reading the law to prevent no refusal, which 
promotes highway safety, would frustrate implied consent’s 
overriding purpose.  
b. Increasing Methods for Evidence Gathering  
Similarly, the goal of public safety will fail if officers cannot 
discover impaired drivers and impose sanctions to discourage DWI 
crimes. The Legislature’s public safety goal is inextricably tied to 
the State’s capability of securing intoxication evidence.276 The 
State’s ability to find, prosecute, and punish impaired drivers 
directly impacts the success of DWI deterrence and conviction.277 
After all, when the State detects intoxicated drivers more frequently, 
this not only demonstrates its commitment to prosecuting DWI 
offenders, but in turn, it “force[s] individuals to take their actions 
more seriously.”278 The implied consent law should therefore assist 
officers in discovering intoxicated drivers and removing them from 
the highways.279 
In contrast, a reading of the law to preclude no-refusal search 
warrants contradicts the statute’s ultimate purpose of facilitating the 
DWI evidence-gathering process. The implied consent statute 
satisfies the Legislature’s safety goal “when there is no search 
warrant, since it is another method of conducting a constitutionally 
valid search. . . . It gives officers an additional weapon in their 
investigative arsenal, enabling them to draw blood in certain limited 
circumstances even without a search warrant.”280 When a suspect 
                                                                                                             
 275. Id.  
 276. See generally Cafaro, supra note 5, at 101 (“Ultimately, this article 
espouses the notion that evidence of a defendant’s BAC is one of the most 
valuable and persuasive pieces of evidence in an OUI case and is directly linked to 
the deterrence function of implied consent laws.”).  
 277. See Rubin, supra note 151, at 1128. 
 278. Id. at 1133. See also Beauchamp, supra note 66, at 1116–17.  
 279. State v. Duquette, 994 P.2d 776, 780 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that 
state legislature intended for State to use DWI crime to justify a search warrant 
under N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-111(A) and that BAT refusal was not a condition 
precedent for search warrant when officer has probable cause of DWI), overruled 
in part on other grounds by State v. Williamson, 212 P.3d 376 (N.M. 2009). 
 280. Beeman v. Texas, 86 S.W.3d 613, 615–16 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (en 
banc). See also LeBlanc, supra note 14.  
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refuses and implied consent fails, the State must be able to rely on 
another constitutional means––like a no-refusal search warrant––to 
continue the search and to collect evidence of intoxication. If, 
however, the statute bars the use of search warrants, the State will 
face an impossible burden in gathering DWI evidence.281 Without 
reliable, objective proof of intoxication, the State will be unable to 
convict DWI offenders.282 As the State loses its ability “to detect 
drinking drivers and enforce their drunk driving laws, the deterrent 
effect is greatly diminished, the laws become less threatening, and 
the danger of drunk driving remains a major problem for the 
public’s safety.”283  
To avoid these harsh results, the government likely anticipated 
that officers would use implied consent in tandem with other 
constitutional procedures for obtaining evidence. The Legislature 
evidenced this intent by including express language that prevents the 
implied consent laws from restricting the DWI evidence-gathering 
process.284 Even the Louisiana Supreme Court recognizes that “the 
legislature did not intend [the implied consent] procedure [to] be the 
exclusive evidence of intoxication.”285 To this end, Louisiana’s 
statute should support no-refusal search warrants.  
C. Avoiding Absurd Results  
In addition to honoring the statute’s purpose, courts must also 
reject any application of the implied consent law that leads to absurd 
consequences.286 In particular, Louisiana courts should avoid a 
construction of the implied consent statute that prohibits no-refusal 
search warrants. Otherwise, a court’s decision to invalidate no 
refusal will undoubtedly produce irrational results for a law intended 
to facilitate DWI investigation and deterrence.  
Specifically, a construction of the law that precludes no-refusal 
warrants would result in a rule that fails to mitigate drinking and 
                                                                                                             
 281. See Rubin, supra note 151, at 1133. 
 282. Id.   
 283. Id.  
 284. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:662 (2002) (“The provisions of Subsection 
A of this section shall not be construed as limiting the introduction of any other 
competent evidence bearing upon the question whether the person was under the 
influence of alcoholic beverages or any abused substance or controlled dangerous 
substance.”); see also discussion supra Part III.B.  
 285. State v. Allen, 440 So. 2d 1330, 1334 (La. 1983).  
 286. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 9 (2011) (“When a law is clear and unambiguous 
and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law should be 
applied as written . . . .” (emphasis added)).  
292 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73 
 
 
 
driving.287 Alcohol-impaired drivers would have the statutory ability 
“to hinder police investigations and the collection of evidence” by 
simply disobeying a search warrant.288 Equally problematic, 
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 32:666 would allow DWI 
suspects to refuse both voluntary and warrant-based searches.289 The 
implied consent statute would essentially give DWI suspects more 
rights than the average citizen by immunizing them from search 
warrants.290 Courts should consequently find that the implied 
consent provisions do not individually or collectively prohibit no-
refusal search warrants.  
Finally, a construction of section 32:662 that bars no-refusal 
search warrants would not only encourage subjective determinations 
by officers who are “engaged in the often competitive enterprise of 
ferreting out crime,”291 but it would also prevent neutral judicial 
oversight in DWI cases. Louisiana courts have interpreted the 
language in Revised Statutes section 32:662, which tacitly 
authorizes the State to use “other competent evidence” of 
intoxication, to allow officer testimony and video evidence 
regarding a suspect’s behavior, including field-sobriety test 
results.292 But “while the field sobriety test provides objective 
criteria on which an officer may base his belief that a subject is 
intoxicated, the officer’s subjective opinion demonstrates whether 
the subject has passed the test.”293 A warrant, on the other hand, 
depends on an objective evaluation of probable cause by a neutral 
and detached judge, which the law favors over an officer’s 
potentially prejudicial assessment.294  
                                                                                                             
 287. See LeBlanc, supra note 14 (“Louisiana’s rate of alcohol-involved 
highway crashes remains stubbornly high, accounting for 409 deaths in 2009.”); 
see also discussion supra Part V.B (“If, however, the statute bars the use of search 
warrants, the State will face an impossible burden in gathering DWI evidence.”). 
 288. City of Seattle v. St. John, 215 P.3d 194, 198 (Wash. 2009).  
 289. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:662; see also City of Seattle, 215 
P.3d at 198.  
 290. See Brown v. State, 774 N.E.2d 1001, 1007 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) 
(“Proscribing the use of a search warrant as a means of obtaining evidence of a 
driver’s intoxication ‘would be to place allegedly drunken drivers in an exalted 
class of criminal defendants, protected by the law from every means of obtaining 
the most important evidence against them.’” (quoting Pena v. State, 684 P.2d 864, 
869 (Alaska 1984))).  
 291. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966) (quoting Johnson v. 
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948)).  
 292. See, e.g., State v. Allen, 440 So. 2d 1330, 1334 (La. 1983); State v. Loisel, 
812 So. 2d 822, 825, 829 (La. Ct. App. 2002); see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
32:662(B); discussion supra Parts III.B.1, III.B.3.  
 293. Loisel, 812 So. 2d at 829 (including an officer’s personal observation of a 
suspect’s behavior, demeanor, and field sobriety test results).  
 294. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770. 
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Jurisprudence indicates the unwillingness of Louisiana courts to 
exclude even subjective and potentially biased DWI evidence.295 
Thus, courts should have little hesitation in allowing officers to 
gather “other competent evidence” pursuant to a no-refusal search 
warrant. No refusal does not give officers carte blanche to perform 
blood draws on every DWI suspect.296 Such policies merely provide 
officers with what the federal and state constitutions already allow––
“the ability to apply for a search warrant, and if the magistrate finds 
probable cause to issue that warrant, the ability to effectuate it.”297 It 
authorizes officers to “present an affidavit to a magistrate in every 
DWI case, just like every other criminal offense,” but “[w]hether 
any search ultimately occurs rests, as always, in the hands of the 
neutral and detached magistrate.”298 And, if the warrant is invalid, 
DWI suspects have the same safeguards as all criminal suspects––
they can file a motion to suppress the BAT analysis.299 Courts 
should undoubtedly sanction no-refusal policies, rather than force 
the State to rely on subjective and possibly biased police 
observations. 
In short, the absurdity that will follow from an invalidation of no 
refusal is primarily threefold: (1) the implied consent statute will be 
unable to meet its intended goals; (2) the DWI suspect will enjoy 
greater rights than other citizens; and (3) the DWI investigation 
process will become more subjective and more burdensome. To 
avoid these bizarre and potentially unconstitutional results, the 
implied consent law should not ban no-refusal search warrants.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
The simple truth is that Louisiana’s implied consent law cannot 
sustain the fight against alcohol-impaired driving. The impending 
danger from increasing refusal rates and DWI mortalities 
necessitates immediate legislative or judicial action. But without 
further guidance from Louisiana judges and lawmakers, no refusal is 
the present answer to defeat the enemy in this DWI battle—alcohol.  
As this Comment demonstrates, no refusal is both a 
constitutional and statutorily valid solution to win Louisiana’s battle 
with alcohol-impaired driving. No-refusal search warrants offer 
motorists greater protection than the Fourth Amendment and the 
Louisiana Constitution in the form of neutral judicial supervision. 
                                                                                                             
 295. See, e.g., Allen, 440 So. 2d at 1334; Loisel, 812 So. 2d at 825.  
 296. Beeman v. State, 86 S.W.3d 613, 616 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (en banc).  
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Likewise, no refusal is equally valid under Louisiana’s implied 
consent law, which does not afford DWI suspects superior statutory 
rights. While the current constitutional paradigm for DWI blood 
draws is outdated and in need of a judicial reevaluation, Louisiana 
courts must uphold the validity of no-refusal search warrants absent 
more stringent constitutional or statutory protections against 
unnecessary governmental intrusion.  
At the same time, this Comment does not hold that no refusal is 
the exclusive remedy to eliminate the threat of impaired driving. 
Admittedly, no refusal’s antagonists raise valid concerns about its 
potential abuses.300 Going forward, the Legislature––not the courts 
—must assess these considerations, and should the Legislature wish 
to prevent courts from sanctioning no-refusal search warrants, it 
must revise the implied consent text to reflect this desire.  
Meanwhile, Louisiana courts cannot rationally deny that the 
clear meaning and statutory aim of the implied consent law support 
no-refusal search warrants. No refusal currently offers Louisiana the 
best opportunity to win the battle against intoxicated driving. In the 
absence of a clear legislative directive, Louisiana won’t take “no” 
for an answer.  
 
Katherine L. Cicardo∗ 
                                                                                                             
 300. See generally Cook, supra note 2, at 112–16 (“[T]he blood search warrant 
is in all practicality an unwanted intrusion upon the rights of two individuals: the 
individual having a needle forced into his or her arm and the medical professional 
forced to push the needle. . . . Today, over one million people in the United States 
are infected with HIV/AIDS alone. Although the chance of catching such a 
communicable disease from a blood draw is practically null, the possibility 
remains, and the fear is real for many people. . . . [A] surprisingly significant 
percentage of the population (up to 10%) suffer from belonephobia—the fear of 
needles. The fear of needles can be so great for these individuals that they will 
actually refuse pain injections after major surgery and even faint at the sight of a 
syringe. . . . There is a potential for a tremendous level of fear and anxiety to be 
thrust upon the law-abiding motorist who is forced by a peace officer to submit to 
a blood search warrant. Moreover, the lengthy process of obtaining a blood search 
warrant significantly interferes with an individual’s right to be left alone and travel 
freely. Citizens do not give up all rights to privacy when they choose to travel 
upon public roads. . . . To strike a reasonable balance in deterring DWI offenses, 
the legislature decided to allow the search for blood in only the most serious of 
occasions, death or serious bodily injury.” (citations omitted)). 
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